Essays on Behavior, Experimental Design, Health and the Environment by Tracy, Josef
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Dissertations Department of Economics
12-14-2017
Essays on Behavior, Experimental Design, Health
and the Environment
Josef Tracy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economics Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tracy, Josef, "Essays on Behavior, Experimental Design, Health and the Environment." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2017.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/142
ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BEHAVIOR, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN,
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
By
J. DUSTIN TRACY
DECEMBER, 2017
Committee Chair: Dr. Paul J. Ferraro
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation comprises three essays that empirically evaluate the effects of policy inter-
ventions that have been inspired by insights from behavioral economics. The essays apply
experimental or quasi-experimental designs to environmental, health and labor issues, in field
and laboratory settings. They analyze if these nudges are effective in market environments,
and if they are likely to continue to have the impact as their popularity continues to grow.
The first chapter analyzes policy banning pharmaceutical representatives from providing
off-site meals to doctors. It examines the effect on the type of medications prescribed,
pharmaceutical and overall medical spending, and self-reported health measures, using the
Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, and individual level difference-in-differences regressions.
The analysis focuses on medications which are still on-patent but are in the same class as a
generic medication, and finds that the regulation significantly decreased the likelihood that
an individual took one of these medications, implying savings. There is no adverse impact on
rates of physical or mental health, or whether they report that health limits daily activities.
The second and third chapter use laboratory experiments to test how awareness impacts
nudges. Awareness has been suggested as a way to make defaults more ethical, but could
make these nudges less effective. Awareness of the impacts of a nudge could also occur as
subjects gain experience, providing information simulates experience.
The second employs a loss framing nudge in a real effort task. I replicate the stan-
dard empirical finding that loss framing (penalties) increases performance (in comparison
to bonuses), but show that this effect disappears when participants are aware of the nudge.
Additionally, I find that the majority of subjects prefer gain framing. Awareness increases
the preference for gain framing.
In the third a default nudge is employed in a carbon offsets purchase decision. All subject
are given the option to buy an offset. One option is randomly selected. Subjects in the Aware
condition then see information about the typical impacts of defaults. I find that the default
was not effective at increasing purchases, and that information did not make it more likely
that subjects change their selection.
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Chapter I
The Cost of Free Lunch:
Banning Pharma from Providing Off-Site Meals to Doctors
I.1 Introduction
Health care costs in the U.S. are 17.5% of the GDP (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2016), nearly twice that of other developed nations (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 2014). Spending on pharmaceuticals totaled $310 billion
in 2015, increasing 8.4% from the previous year, according to the Pew Center (Coukell and
Shih, 2016). The pharmaceutical industry has healthy profits, and while down to 9.3% from
a peak of 10.4% in 2006, pharmaceutical spending is roughly twice as much of overall health
care spending as it was in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Additionally, some medication regimes cost
thousands of dollars a month, with single pills costing as much as $30. The industry justifies
these prices as necessary to recoup the cost of researching and developing medications. Yet
many insurers, policy makers, and health care experts disagree, and thus see pharmaceutical
spending as a good place to make cuts, and key to reducing overall health care costs (Rizzo,
1999).
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Aggressive marketing is one of the reasons costs are rising, charge critics of the indus-
try (Spingarn et al., 1996; Kowalczyk, 2009). In response, when spending on medications
as a percentage of overall health care cost was near its peak, a handful of states passed
legislation that restricted the gifts pharmaceutical companies could bestow upon doctors
and/or required that the gifts be disclosed. These gifts include meals, tickets to events,
and other goods and services. Massachusetts passed one of the most stringent laws curbing
these practices. Starting on July 1, 2009, pharmaceutical companies (and medical device
manufacturers) could no longer provide doctors and other medical providers1 with tickets
to events, cash (except for bona fide services), or off-site meals, and they had to disclose
gifts worth over $50 they gave to prescribers (Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and
Human Services, 2009).
The ban restricted where trainings could be held, so that manufacturers could not effec-
tively give prescribers free vacations by holding training at resorts. Similarly, by constraining
meals to offices and hospitals, the industry could not host trainings at upscale restaurants.
These restrictions not only reduce how enticing the gift is, but may also lead to shorter
presentations because doctors may not allocate as much time to on-site meals. Additionally,
doctors may not pay as much attention to presentations in the workplace, because they are
still surrounded by all the distractions and responsibilities of work, so may not be as suscep-
tible to marketing messages. Finally, if the off-site trainings are larger there could be more
of a peer pressure effect.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of the ban, which is uncertain.
To my knowledge, no published study has estimated the impact of any of these bans. If the
now-prohibited marketing strategies were effective, a ban might be successful in reducing
pharmaceutical spending. However, with so many other tools still available, the industry
1Throughout I use the term “doctors” to refer to any prescriber. Although this is less accurate, it avoids
phrases such as “the prescribers prescribed...”
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may still be able to persuade doctors to prescribe profitable products. The ban has a poten-
tial impact not only on pharmaceutical spending, but also on health. Some research finds
that despite the rising costs, the care received is worth the costs (Lichtenberg, 2001; Cutler
and McClellan, 2001; Miller and Sarpong, 2011). Other studies claim that pharmaceutical
treatment alone can be nearly as beneficial as surgical procedures at much lower costs (Wein-
traub et al., 2008; Mark et al., 2009). If increased pharmaceutical spending produces better
health or lower costs (by preventing substitution to more expensive non-drug treatments),
gift bans could have harmful consequences even if expenditures on drugs decreased.
The analysis focuses on the impact on branded medications with only indirect generic
competition (BMIGC). Overall pharmaceutical spending is also examined. A two-stage
hurdle model is used, where the first stage predicts non-zero spending and the second stage
is the natural log of costs. I focus on total cost, the sum of what is paid by the consumer and
the insurer. The effects on perceived health status, whether health limits daily activities,
and other medical costs are estimated, are examined to test for unintended consequences
from the ban. Individual-level, pooled regressions are used with the larger data set. The
analysis is repeated using first-difference regressions for the participants in the panel which
spanned the reform.
The regulation significantly decreased the likelihood that an individual is taking one of
these medications, and resulted in overall savings. There was no evidence of substitution
toward generics. Additionally, there are significant improvements in how respondents rated
their physical or mental health, or whether they report that health limits daily activities.
The regulation, which also applied to the marketing of other medical devices, also decreases
the likelihood of having any medical expenses, though there is no significant impact on the
cost, conditional on having a medical expense. Finally, there is evidence the regulation
improved some health outcomes. This paper analyzes a particular reform that was designed
to curb pharmaceutical spending, and estimates its effects on cost and health. However,
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the regulation targets high cost medications, for which there are less expensive alternatives.
Since any program aimed at cutting pharmaceutical spending is likely to focus on these same
medications, my findings may generalize to other proposed programs.
I.2 Literature and Theory
Ubiquitous direct to consumer advertising is familiar to all of us. What may not be as
evident is the industry’s efforts to convince doctors and other prescribers of the benefits of the
latest product. The industry spends $12 billion on marketing to prescribers and consumers.
Hafemeister and Bryan (2009) outline the practices employed. “Detailing” is the practice of
sending representatives to a prescriber’s office to provide details about the medication, such
as dosage instructions, and possible on-label applications.2 These “detail men” often bring
with them various small-value items, such as pens, assorted office supplies, stress-balls, or
food to curry favor with staff and doctors and help get their foot in the door. These small
“swag” items prominently feature the medications name and logo, which are designed to
promote salience – to keep the name of the medication on the prescriber’s mind, so that it
is quickly associated with a patient’s ailment.
Meals accompanied by presentations about the merits of the medication are provided
both on-site and off-site. Often, particularly off-site, presenters are doctors who write many
prescriptions for the product (and are being rewarded for high prescribing). These doctors
are paid to make these presentations and may travel with their expenses paid. Medical
professionals are required to attend continuing medical education (CME) trainings. Phar-
maceutical companies sponsor trainings that count toward CME and subsidize or discount
them. Trainings may also be held in resort locations. Whether lured by the location, food
2It is illegal for representatives to promote off-label applications.
4
served, or because it was a cheap way to fulfill CME credits, the information disseminated
at these events favors the sponsor’s medication.
Several academic studies of various marketing practices have cast doubt upon the ideal
that decisions about what medication to prescribe are made with rational detachment or
with cost effectiveness in mind. Interactions with marketing representatives start in medical
school (Sandberg et al., 1997). Contact with a pharmaceutical representative is a primary
mode for doctors to learn about new medications (Peay and Peay, 1988), can lead doctors
to request adding medications to formularies (Chren and Landefeld, 1994) and can increase
sales and demand elasticity (Rizzo, 1999). Orlowski and Wateska (1992) not only find that
seminars in attractive destinations lead doctors to prescribe the featured medications more
frequently, but they also characterize their finding as, “suggesting that the new drugs were not
replacing older alternatives, but instead that the enticements were resulting in additional and
perhaps excessive use” (p.4).3 Additionally, it has been shown that physicians medication
choice can depend on their own financial interests (Liu et al., 2009; Iizuka, 2012).
In light of this research, as well as a general distaste for what is often characterized as
overaggressive marketing, when spending on medications as a percentage of overall health
care cost was near its peak, a handful of states passed new legislation. These laws restricted
the gifts pharmaceutical companies could bestow upon doctors and/or required that the gifts
be disclosed. These gifts include meals, other goods, and services (e.g., tickets to an event).
Proponents of these laws believe that the gifts entice physicians to prescribe medicines
they would not otherwise prescribe. Doctors have imperfect knowledge of the various medi-
cation options, and there are search costs to improve knowledge of any individual medication.
Offering meals raises the salience of information about the featured medication and lower
search costs. Doctors may also be overtly seeking a reward, or feel indebted to those giving
them gifts (Katz et al., 2010). For this reason, proponents argue that curbing these mar-
3Italics are my own.
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keting practices could prevent doctors from prescribing more expensive medicines in place
of cheaper substitutes, thereby reducing pharmaceutical spending. Minnesota has had a
marketing restriction, preventing gifts totaling more than $50 retail value in a calendar year
since 1993. Vermont (VT) also banned all gifts starting in 2009. Massachusetts passed one
of the most stringent laws curbing these practices. Starting on July 1, 2009, pharmaceutical
companies (and medical device manufacturers) could no longer provide doctors with tickets
to events, cash (except for bona fide services), or off-site meals, and had to disclose gifts
worth over $50 given to prescribers (Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human
Services, 2009).
There is reason to believe these reform might be successful. Brotzman and Mark (1992)
examine the impact of one medical school’s change in policy restricting interactions between
industry sales representatives and medical residents. They find that, after graduating, the
doctors schooled with the restrictions had fewer interactions with pharmaceutical represen-
tatives. Brotzman and Mark did not measure any effects of the training ban on subsequent
prescription patterns. Particular to meals, DeJong et al. (2016) show that even when there
is not clear evidence of a medication’s advantages over a cheaper generic in the same class,
those prescribers accepting meals from a pharmaceutical manufacture are more likely to pre-
scribe branded medications. While they make a strong case for a relationship between the
type of doctors who accept meals and those who prescribe the promoted drug, DeJong et
al. did not control for likely selection bias, and thus cannot say anything about what those
same doctors would do had they not received these meals. Analyzing this reform allows
us to answer the question what would happen if at least the off-site meals were removed.
Additionally, my analysis is at a larger scale than the policy of a single medical school, and
examines many more medications.
I will examine the effect on medications which are most likely to be impacted: branded
medications with only indirect generic competition (BMIGC) I do not analyze the medica-
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tions for which there is no generic competition. In these cases, consumers can either purchase
expensive drugs (NPR, 2011), or take nothing. If there is competition, it is between two
branded medications, and both firms will be hampered by the regulation, so there is no the-
ory by which to predict results. I also do not analyze the medications for which the patent
protection has expired and generic substitutes. The industry refers to this expiration as go-
ing over the “Patent Cliff.” When protections expire, medications quickly lose market share
to generics (Latham, 2013). In one extreme case, Prozac lost 70% of its market share in 5
months (Song and Han, 2016). Market share plummets because insurers, and in many cases,
state law compel substitution from brand names to chemically equivalent generics. Often,
efforts to market the products are minimal after the patent expires because purchasers have
so much power.
BMIGC often occur when one firm introduces a new and effective drug, and patents
its particular chemical compound. Once a medication gets Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval, the firm will immediately begin marketing it to recoup research and devel-
opment expenses and maximize profits. Competitors then try to make a chemical compound
that is chemically distinct enough that it can be produced without violating the patent, but
chemically similar enough that it has nearly the same effect. The competitor can then patent
this “copycat” medication. The original drug goes off patent first. Afterwards, if a third
firm can prove to the FDA that it can produce a “chemically equivalent” product, then it
can market this generic alternative. Generics are generally on the market soon after patents
expire. However, it may have taken the competitors several years to identify a similar chem-
ical compound. Because the patents were granted years later, they expire years later. This
creates a period when the copycat medications are still on patent, and the original drug is
available as a generic; in other words, an appropriate and low-cost substitute for the copycat
medications is available. Manufacturers of the copycats are still marketing them heavily to
squeeze rents out of the patents before they expire. Figure I.1 provides a graphical depiction
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Figure I.1: Medications Likely to be Impacted
Patent Protection
Patent ProtectionNew Med
Copy Cat
Generic
Time
Similar
enough to
treat same
condition
Different enough
to not violate patent
Therapeutically/Chemically Equivalent
$326.89
BMIGC
$2,299
$4,893
of this process. In the figure, the X Axis represents time. This paper analyzes the time
period to the right of the dotted line. The figure also contains average annual prices, for
BMIGCs, generic substitutes and branded medications without generic competitors.
Often policy and legislation is experimental, and effects are uncertain. This is particularly
true when the policy is novel. However, even when adopting policy other jurisdictions have
enacted, outcomes are not given. There can be heterogeneity in treatment effects, due to
different characteristics of the jurisdictions or population, or the new policy can interact
with or be moderated by other regulation or systems within the government4. Applying
experimental terminology, this would be seen as a situation in which there are multiple
levels of treatment. Both groups receive at least the basic treatment whereas one group (not
MA) receives supplemental treatment in addition to the basic treatment. Actually, MA had
been receiving the treatment as well, but now no longer receives it. However, the important
question is: what exactly comprises this additional treatment?
4For instance, a regulation like this could be moderated by medical malpractice laws, and may be really
effective in one location but not as effective in another with different malpractice laws.
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The MA regulation restricted where trainings could be held, so that manufacturers could
not effectively give prescribers free vacations and fancy dinner by holding training at resorts
or high-end restaurants. These restrictions not reduce how enticing the gift is. Additionally,
doctors may not allocate much time or attention presentations in the workplace, because they
are still surrounded by all the distractions and responsibilities of work. Shorter presentations
is unlikely as a mechanism; both because the representatives seem well practiced at honing
their message and because doctors constantly operate in an atmosphere where they quickly
absorb the most pertinent information. I posit that the setting, and the doctors role there, is
the true difference. Off-site events are likely to be larger more formal presentations in which
the doctor is an audience member in a conference-like setting. Generally the presentation is
given at least in part by another doctor the industry would describe as a “thought leader.”
The social pressure to accept expert advice like peers in the audience may be the true
difference. Unfortunately I do not have the data to test this set of hypotheses.
The effect of the reform is uncertain. There are four basic scenarios. The first is that
there is no change. This would be the case if the off-site meals have no sway on what doctors
prescribe or because the industry was able to substitute other marketing, such as more on-
site meals, to counter the effects. It is even possible that there could be a paradoxical effect,
if the other marketing was effective enough. The remaining scenarios result in lower rates of
prescribing BMIGC. These remaining scenarios differ in what comes in its place.
One scenario is that cheaper generic medications are substituted for the BMIGC. This
would be the case if the information provided with the off-site meals influenced how the
doctor treated a condition but not whether or not the patient received treatment. This
scenario results in savings. The generic medication could work better, no different, or worse
than the BMIGC. Clearly, the first two have positive net benefits. If the generic works worse,
the net effect would depend upon how much worse, what the health implications were, and
how those compare to the reduction in medication costs. Another basic scenario is that
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there is substitution toward other medical care. This might mean surgical options in place of
statins, diet and exercise in place of cholesterol medications, or therapy and hospitalizations
in place of psychiatric medications. Here the implications for cost are ambiguous, and the
question of relative effectiveness remains.
The final scenario is that nothing comes in the place of the BMIGC, this has two vari-
ants. One is that both with and without the regulation the patient is treated with another
(generic) medication and that the BMIGC was supplementing this treatment when there is
no regulation. This is picking up on a suggestion from Orlowski and Wateska (1992) that
the medications were not being prescribed in place of other medications, but in addition to
them. The other variant is that the patient gets no treatment for the condition. This would
be the case if the information accompanying the meal influenced the decision as to whether
or not to treat a condition, either through increasing awareness of the condition or drawing
attention to he fact that treatment was available. The industry argues that marketing helps
patients by addressing both of these issues. In both variants, the cost of the BMIGC option
is higher. In either variant, there are three outcomes. The (addition of) the BMIGC could
make the condition better, no different, or worse. The latter two have net costs, while the
net benefit of the former depends on how much the condition improved relative to the cost
of the medication.
I analyze how the ban impacts BMIGC to determine if the outcome is the first scenario
or one of the latter three. I next estimate the effect on prescriptions overall. A decrease
here would indicate that the BMIGCs were add-ons or new treatments. I examine if there
is substitution toward generic competitors. Increases in these prescriptions would indicate
that it was the third scenario. Finally, I look at the impact on other spending: an increase
here would indicate that it was the final scenario that was realized. In reality, the marketing,
the regulation prohibits, is likely to have heterogeneous effects, so banning the marketing
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will result in a different scenario for each patient-medication combination.5 The analysis
attempts to uncover which scenarios occur for a significant number of patients. To determine
outcomes within scenarios, I estimate the impact on perceived health status, and whether
health limits daily activities.
I.3 Data and Methodology
For this analysis, I use data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ)’s Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). AHRQ began MEPS in 1996. They
survey a national representative subsample of households from the National Center for Health
and Statistics National Health Interview Survey regarding “demographic characteristics,
health conditions, health status, use of medical services, charges and source of payments,
access to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment.”
Households are surveyed for two consecutive years and assigned weights. I use data from
2000 to 2011. The ban was loosened in 2012. This was also the year when the Federal
“Sunshine” law for reporting gifts from drug companies took effect. State identifiers for the
29 most populous states are available through AHRQ. Vermont is among the 21 states that
AHRQ will not decode. I use the subpop prefix to remove all these states and Minnesota
(MN) from the control, because of the preexisting bans. However, subpop retains data from
observations in these states for calculating standard errors. The number of individuals in my
subsample ranges from 18,677 from 9535 households in 2007 to 34,252 from 9,535 households
11,957 in 2002. The number of subjects who had prescription ranges from 11,759 individual
in 2007 to 20,488 in 2002. In all, for the 12 years, there are 329,850 person-year observations
5Absent the regulation, Mr. Jones could be on a BMIGC statin; with the regulation, he could be on
the same statin, and thus fall into the first scenario: no change. However, the same patient could also
be a BMIGC atypical anti-psychotic without the regulation and be on a generic anti-psychotic when the
regulation is in place (Scenario 2), while his neighbor could be on a BMIGC antidepressant without the
regulation and not be on the antidepressant, but receiving psychotherapy with the regulation (Scenario 3).
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with no missing relevant variables in the sample, 5,113 in MA. Table I.1 reports demograph-
ics for the sample and MA. MA respondents are statistically significantly more likely to be
in an MSA, black, Hispanic, and older. MA respondents are also more educated. All these
variables are included as controls in the analyses.
Table I.1: Sample Demographics
In an MSA at end of survey year 85.9 %
Presently Married 40.7 %
Black 13.1 %
Female 51 %
Hispanic 15.9 %
Currently Smoke 14.2 %
Age at end of survey year 36.3
(22.3) a
Has Private Insurance 68.9 %
Has Public Insurance 18.6 %
Has No Insurance 12.4 %
Poor b 13 %
Near Poor c 4.5 %
Low Income d 13.8 %
Middle Income e 31.2 %
High Income f 37.6 %
No Degree 13.6 %
High School or GED 36.9 %
Bachelor’s Degree 12.8 %
Graduate Degree 6.4 %
Observations 329,850
a (Standard Deviation)
b Income < Poverty line (PL)
c 100%PL < Income < 125%PL
d 125%PL < Income < 200%PL
e 200%PL < Income < 400%PL
f 400%PL < Income
The Massachusetts Healthcare Reform (“RomneyCare”) took effect in 2007 but took
several years to phase in. Following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I implement a pair
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of dummies to indicate implementation of RomneyCare and post years: for MA 2006 and
2007 are coded as during and 2009 is coded as post. Additionally, to control for provisions
that did not take effect immediately or for any delayed impact, I run regressions using the
subpop prefix and restrict the respondents to those unlikely to be affected by the reform.
The first variant is models which only include respondents 65 and older. These models are
of particular interest because elderly individuals are more likely to take medications. The
second variant is those who have employer provided insurance. This excludes those who
obtained insurance through “The Connector” that the reform established, and those with
public health insurance.
Should all of these not control for RomneyCare, the effects are likely to diminish those of
the marketing regulation. RomneyCare increased insurance rates and quality, making it more
likely that residents would have insurance that covered prescriptions. Lower out-of-pocket
costs to consumers would make it more likely that they were on prescription medications
and thus should increase total costs of prescribed medications.
The data on medications has a record for each prescription, so there are over 300,000
observations in some years. Each record has the medication name and overall price; there are
also breakdowns of who paid what toward the overall price. Figure I.2 graphs the spending
per person on medication in across years for all medication and branded medication with
only indirect generic competition (BMIGC). It shows overall cost more than doubling across
the period.
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Figure I.2: Annual Spending per Person on Medications
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Subjects are surveyed about their health status: they are asked to rate both their phys-
ical and mental health on a five-point scale ranging from “excellent” to “poor.” They are
also asked about whether their health limits their ability to work, and do basic activities
such as climb stairs, socialize, and walk various distances. In addition to all variables for
individual limitation, there is a variable which indicates whether they answered yes to any
of the questions about limitations. Additionally, MEPS contains data on other medical ex-
penditures. Because MEPS is so rich and contains information on both medication taken
(and their costs) as well as health outcomes, it is a good data set to answer both parts of
the research question: was the ban successful in curbing cost, and did that have an adverse
impact on health, or other medical spending?
However, MEPS is limited in that it is a relatively small dataset for a state-level estima-
tion. On average, there are fewer than a thousand respondents per state per year. There is
also a great deal of variability in what medications a person is taking and the total cost of
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those medications. Respondents cycling in and out of the sample causes the mix of respon-
dents with high and low costs in a state to vary, and introduces sampling variation. This
variation obscures the state trend and made it difficult to construct a synthetic control per
Abadie et al. (2010). It is also not clear how to apply the synthetic control method while uti-
lizing MEPS strata structure. Instead, I use individual level regressions. While attempting
to synthesize a control for Massachusetts, I identified California (CA), Connecticut (CT),
New Jersey (NJ) and Virginia (VA) as having similar trends. I include regression limited to
these states as a robustness check. While it would be natural to use the other New England
states as a control, the only other New England state decoded is Connecticut.
The small sample size at the state level also precludes focusing on individual medications.
Instead, medications are that likely to be impacted by the regulations are pooled. For 2009,
the first year the regulation is in effect, the 115 top grossing medications within MEPS, those
for which aggregate spending in the sample was above $40,000, are identified. Then for the
ones which are still under patent protection (branded with no chemically equivalent generic
available), I determine if there are any viable generic substitutes.6 If there were suitable
generic substitutes the medication was considered a BMIGC. The process is described more
fully with examples in Appendix A Table I.2 reports the mean costs per participant per
year of these BMIGC in comparison to other medication for the three treatment years. The
average cost of the BMIGC is significantly higher than other medications, though there is
much variation in the other medications, as they include both cheap generics and expen-
sive branded medication some without any competition. Also reported are average cost per
year for likely generic substitutes and other branded medications. Additionally, medica-
tions which were likely substitutes (generic medications in with the same classification as a
BMIGC) are identified. For each respondent, I calculate the total cost of the medications
6Substitutes were identified through various Internet resources, and the FDA’s Orange Book site was
used to determine when any generic substitute became available.
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they took as well as subtotals for BMIGCs. These are the variables of interest.
Table I.2: Mean Cost per Year for Prescribed Medication
Obs Mean Cost SD
BMIGC’s 49 2299.45 4588.59
Other Meds 6298 432.01 8333.96
Other Branded 24 4893.42 9331.79
Generics 36 326.89 400.05
Table I.3 reports the percentages of respondents taking medications. The first two
columns state rate pre-reform, the third and fourth columns post-reform. The rate for
MA is reported. The columns labeled US report rates for the sample excluding MA. Rates
are reported for BMIGCs, their generic substitutes, and any medication. The rates of taking
a BMIGC rises for both, but more quickly for non-MA. The rates of taking a substitute rise
for as well but more quickly for MA. Despite a rise in both of these subcategories the overall
rate of taking medications falls slightly. These rates are reported to provide a baseline and
context for the regression results, and not as statistical tests of the effect they are however
consistent with the regulation causing substitution from BIMGCs to generics.
Table I.3: Percentages of Respondents Taking Medication
Pre Post
US MA US MA
Taking a BMIGC 10.8% 13.1% 14.4% 15.9%
Taking a generic sub 5.1% 6.9% 19% 22.9%
Taking any medication 62.7% 67% 61.5% 65.7%
Commonly, individuals do not spend anything on medications (or subcategories of med-
ications). I implement a two-stage hurdle model,7 where the first stage is the probability
7A full information maximum likelihood model (FIML) was also estimated. FIML results were very
similar to the results of the two stage model an are not reported.
16
that there is any spending. The first stage was estimated using a probit models. Natural
logarithms are used in the second stage to account for the fact that the non-zero spending
amounts have a right skew, a handful of observations with extremely high values8. The
model for both stages is:
Yist = β1PharmaRegist + β2Romneyist + β3 ~Xist + β4σs + β5ϕt + εist
where Yist is the outcome for individual i in state s in year t, β1 is the coefficient of interest,
the impact of the regulation on the likelihood that an individual is taking a (BMIGC or
substitute) medication, or the natural log of the total cost of all the individual’s medications.
RomneyCare is the above-mentioned pair of dummy variables to note during and post
RomneyCare years in MA. ~X is a vector of individual level controls, including income level,
education level, age, sex, dummy variables for actively smoking, being in an MSA, being
black or Hispanic, or being diabetic and insulin dependent. I also include state σs and year
ϕt dummies, and utilize the strata and primary sampling unit (PSU) information provided.
Regressions are implemented using Stata survey (SVY) commands, which cluster errors on
strata. An alternative specification does not make use of the survey commands in order to
cluster errors at the state level9.
As an additional check, I limit the data to Panel 13, the participants who were surveyed in
both 2008 and 2009. For these regressions, the outcome of interest is the change in spending
between 2008 and 2009 between and whether that is impacted by the regulation, so increases
in Massachusetts are compared to those in the control state. Table I.4 reports spending from
both years, their difference, and the natural log of 2009 spending divided by 2008 spending.
Average spending in the control states increased from $781 to $872 a difference of $90. In
8The residuals from the regression on logged expenses were normally distributed, whereas the residuals
in the non-logged model were not normally distributed
9Strata span states so it was not possible to use a nested model
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MA, the increase was from $1,237 to $1,304, a difference of $67.
Table I.4: Means of Pharmaceutical Spending for Panel 13
Obs 2008 2009 $ ∆ ln(2009/2008)
Full Control 15,162 781.4 871.76 90.36 .011
(2,085.28) (2,850.7) (2,320.99) (1.406)
CA, CT, NJ & VA 4,180 728.99 842.58 113.59 .024
(2,255.24) (3,642.33) (3,241.2) (1.443)
MA 268 1,237.4 1,304.67 67.28 -.057
(3,170.56) (3,527.6) (1,379.07) (1.267)
The rightmost column of Table I.4 is the dependent variable in the regressions. Any
individual who did not reside in the same state both years was excluded via subpop. As
most the independent variables in the previous model are not time varying, the only inde-
pendent variables included are whether the individual is in MA and interactions of the two
categorical variables for the type of insurance (private, public or none) the individual had for
the respective years. Regression of the natural log of year over year totals for the BMIGC
are also included, as are changes in limitation status and self-assessed physical and mental
health.
I.4 Results
For all the results, the first column is the full sample (after dropping MN and the 21
still encoded states). The second and third columns are checks for lingering results of Rom-
neyCare. The subpopulations represented in these columns were largely unaffected by the
reforms. The second column is those who are 65 or older. The third column includes only
respondents insured through their employer. The fourth through sixth columns repeat the
same groupings but use the subpop prefix limit the control to California, Connecticut, New
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Jersey, and Virginia. The top half of the table reports results of estimates which utilized the
survey commands and the PSU and strata information provided. The bottom half of the
table repeats all the regression clustering by state, but not making use of the survey com-
mands or PSU and strata information. The two methods yield the same point estimates, but
differ in their estimates of standard error, due to the different assumptions of error structure.
The survey command standard error estimates are larger, due to greater similarity in errors
within strata than within states. I will focus on these more conservative estimates.
Table I.5 reports average marginal effects from probit regressions of the marketing restric-
tions impact on the likelihood of taking medications. Within each half of the table, the top
section reports results for the BMIGCs. The middle section of the table reports results for
taking any medication. The bottom section reports results for taking a generic medication
that is in the same class as a BMIGC. The results indicate that the marketing regulation
made it less likely that an individual in any of the groups was taking a BMIGC. This result
was stronger for those over 65 and weaker for those insured through their employer. Return-
ing to the four scenarios outlined in Section 2, this result implies there were some individuals
who were not in the first scenario (no change), but leaves open the question of which of the
three remaining scenarios occurred. These results also indicate that the regulation did not
make it any less likely that the general population or those 65 years or older were any less
likely to have any medication expense. They do indicate that those insured through their
employer were less likely to be taking any medication. Clustering errors by state indicate
all the groups were less likely to be taking any medication, with the exception of the seniors
when compared to the four state control group.
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Table I.5: Probit Models
Estimates using Survey Command
Are Taking A BMIGC
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing -0.035** -0.123* -0.037** -0.034*** -0.122* -0.041**
Restriction (0.013) (0.074) (0.018) (0.013) (0.072) (0.018)
Sub-Pop Obs. 329,734 36,188 153,858 88,248 8,440 40,478
Are Taking Any Prescribed Medication
Marketing -0.049 -0.015 -0.071** -0.043 -0.003 -0.066*
Restriction (0.032) (0.045) (0.035) (0.034) (0.051) (0.037)
Sub-Pop Obs. 329,853 36,191 153,908 88,308 8,440 40,495
Are Taking a “Substitute” Medication
Marketing -0.033*** -0.019 -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.020 -0.032**
Restriction (0.010) (0.065) (0.013) (0.010) (0.065) (0.013)
Sub-Pop Obs. 329,853 36,191 153,908 88,248 8,442 40,463
Estimates when Clustering by State
Are Taking A BMIGC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing -0.034*** -0.123*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.119*** -0.041***
Restriction (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.027) (0.004)
Observations 329,734 36,188 153,858 88,248 8,440 40,478
Are Taking Any Prescribed Medication
Marketing -0.049*** -0.015** -0.071*** -0.043*** -0.003 -0.066***
Restriction (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 329,853 36,191 153,908 88,308 8,440 40,495
Are Taking a “Substitute” Medication
Marketing -0.033*** -0.018** -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.019 -0.032***
Restriction (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.008)
Observations 329,853 36,191 153,908 88,248 8,442 40,463
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The results also indicate that the regulation made it less likely that an individual is
taking a generic medication in the same classification as the BMIGCs. This is a puzzling
result which I cannot explain. One possibility is spillover from meals and detailing. That
is, because of the meals, the environment they create, and the information conveyed there,
doctors become aware of the conditions the featured medications are meant to treat, but then
do not prescribe the featured medication instead prescribe a generic competitor. There is
some evidence of spillover effect from direct to consumer advertising of medications Kravitz
et al. (2005).
Combined with the results from the bottom two sections of the table, the results indicate,
that at least for those insured through their employers, that the BMIGCs were not substitutes
for generics but an additional medication. Often direct to consumer advertising focuses
on subjective symptoms such as upset stomach, feeling blue, etc. These are symptoms
nearly everyone experiences periodically, however if they were severe or frequent enough
they could be debilitating. The questions are: how frequent or severe warrants prescription
medication, and does advertising lower the frequency/severity bar? A similar dynamic in
detailing could persuade doctors that they were missing illness in patients that needed to be
treated, and explain why the alternative to a branded medication was no treatment. There
are also instances in which brand name medications are promoted as adjunct therapy or as
a complement to a patient’s existing medication.
The next series of tables test what the outcomes of the scenarios were. Table I.6 re-
ports average marginal effect from regressions on natural logs of the individual spending on
medications. This is a second stage to the above regressions. Within each half, the top
section reports the impact on total cost for BMIGC’s conditional on taking at least one.
The second section is more policy relevant, the impact on overall pharmaceutical spending
conditional on taking any medication. Given the variability of individual spending and the
smaller sample, there is high variance and results are statistically insignificant when using
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the more conservative standard error estimates from the survey command. The standard
error estimates when clustering on states indicate that for the whole population there was a
significant reduction in the cost of an individual’s medications conditional on that individual
taking medication. Paired with the results from the above two tables, this indicate that the
policy saved money. Even with the more conservative errors, the ban saved money because
there was no evidence that costs conditional on taking medications changed, but there was
indication people were less likely to be taking medications. Costs are reduced in estimates
just for those who have employer-based insurance, though the magnitude is slightly less. The
“All” group includes people on public insurance and those who bought insurance through
“The Connector.” The effect for the cost of medications for seniors is ambiguous; they are
less likely to have any costs but conditional on having any costs, costs are greater.
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Table I.6: Natural Logs of Total Cost of:
Estimates using Survey Command
BMIGC’s
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
0.006 -0.025 -0.057 0.005 -0.004 -0.063
(0.029) (0.045) (0.042) (0.033) (0.048) (0.047)
Sub-Pop Obs. 33,692 10,746 17,082 7,161 2,270 3,606
All Prescribed Medications
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.035 0.014 -0.025 -0.032 0.041 -0.026
(0.024) (0.040) (0.034) (0.026) (0.044) (0.037)
Sub-Pop Obs. 192,493 32,792 97,353 47,022 7,527 23,616
Estimates when Clustering by State
BMIGC’s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
0.007 -0.025*** -0.057*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.063
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.032)
Observations 33,692 10,746 17,082 7,161 2,270 3,606
All Prescribed Medications
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.034*** 0.015* -0.025*** -0.032** 0.042** -0.026
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Observations 192,493 32,792 97,353 47,022 7,527 23,616
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.7 present results for the regulation’s impact on the probability that an individual
has any reported medical expense. It reports the average marginal effects from a probit
regression. The 65 or older columns are not included in the probit table, because nearly all
the individuals 65 or older had medical expenses. The results indicate the regulation made
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it less likely that individuals had any medical expenses reported. The coefficients are larger
than those for the regressions for having medical expenses, so there is not any evidence of
any spillover of expenses. There is also indication that there is less likely to be other ex-
penses. This may be due to the fact that the restriction not only applied to pharmaceutical
companies, but to all medical device manufacturers.
Table I.7: Probit Model of Likelihood that Individual Has Any Medical Expenses
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All Empr Insrd All Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.068*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.073**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030)
Sub-Pop Obs. 329,850 153,908 88,308 40,115
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All Empr Insrd All Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.069*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.075***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 329,853 153,908 88,308 40,115
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.8 reports estimates of average marginal effects of the impact of the natural log of
total medical costs. The top half of the table reports results when using the survey structure
to estimate standard errors the bottom half when clustering errors at the state level. The
only significant results are for the overall population relative to both controls, and indicate
slight increases in the cost. This is conditional upon having any cost. So the overall ef-
fect given the estimates from the previous tables is ambiguous. In the larger control, the
estimates for seniors and those insured through their employers have the opposite sign, in-
dicating that this rise in cost is possible a lingering effect from RomneyCare, the rise is due
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to those on public insurance or who bought it through the exchange.
Table I.8: Natural Log of Individuals’ Medical Expenses
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
0.009 -0.002 -0.000 0.012 0.013 0.001
(0.017) (0.036) (0.015) (0.018) (0.037) (0.016)
R-squared 0.237 0.073 0.187 0.233 0.091 0.186
Sub-Pop Obs. 266,006 34,686 134,000 68,417 8,057 34,377
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
0.009*** -0.002 -0.000 0.012** 0.013 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 266,006 34,686 134,000 68,417 8,057 34,377
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The next series of tables report results on the regulation’s impact on self-assessed health,
both physical and mental, and whether participants report that health problems cause any
limitations in daily activities. Tables I.9 and I.10 present coefficients from ordered probit
regressions on how individuals rated their respective physical and mental health. Better
health was coded with lower numbers, so negative coefficients indicate improved perceived
health. For the survey command estimates, the coefficients in neither table are significant,
so there is a lack of evidence of negative impact from the regulation on self-assessed health,
or that the BMIGC was superior to the generic. When errors are clustered at the state
level, standard errors estimates are smaller, and suggest that the regulation significantly
improved how participants rated their health. This is the case for physical health for the
overall population for both controls and seniors for the larger control. For seniors, in com-
parison to the smaller control and those with employer-based insurance, the results are still
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statistically insignificant. The estimates for mental health indicate statistically significant
improvement for the overall population compared to the full control group. All the other
coefficient estimates are in the same direction, except seniors when compared to the smaller
control. However, none of them are statistically significant. I did not report marginal effects,
because for an ordered probit there is no single number.
Table I.9: Ordered Probit Model of Individuals’ Self-Assessed Physical Health
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.038 -0.105 0.024 -0.037 -0.038 0.018
(0.072) (0.168) (0.112) (0.078) (0.174) (0.116)
Sub-Pop Obs. 328,933 35,626 153,669 88,110 8,325 40,436
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.037*** -0.105*** 0.025 -0.036** -0.040 0.020
(0.011) (0.034) (0.018) (0.016) (0.046) (0.033)
Observations 328,933 35,626 153,669 88,110 8,325 40,436
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table I.10: Ordered Probit Model of Individuals’ Self-Assessed Mental Health
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.039 -0.041 -0.034 -0.041 0.071 -0.069
(0.094) (0.155) (0.135) (0.098) (0.167) (0.136)
Sub-Pop Obs. 328,891 35,626 153,656 88,107 8,326 40,434
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing
Restriction
-0.037*** -0.040 -0.033 -0.040 0.068 -0.067
(0.013) (0.037) (0.021) (0.035) (0.097) (0.044)
Observations 328,891 35,626 153,656 88,107 8,326 40,434
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.11 presents regression results for the regulation impacting whether a surveyed
individual reports that his or her health limits his or her daily activities. Table I.11 reports
the average marginal effects of probit regressions. This variable is binary (0/1) where ”1”
indicates that activity is limited, so again a negative sign for the coefficient has the impli-
cation of improved health. All the estimates indicate individuals are less likely to report
activity limitations after the regulation. Only estimates using the survey commands are
reported; if they are statistically significant the less conservative clustering by state will also
be statistically significant.
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Table I.11: Probit Model of Likelihood that Individual Has Activity Limitation
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing -0.028*** -0.136*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.135** -0.025***
Restriction (0.007) (0.052) (0.008) (0.007) (0.055) (0.009)
Sub-Pop Obs. 302,771 35,568 144,275 81,137 8,313 37,890
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I.4.1 Panel 13
MEPS Panel 13 spanned the reform; participants were surveyed for both 2008 and 2009.
Regression estimates for this panel are reported as a robustness check for the primary regres-
sions. The specification of the regressions and the outcomes regressed vary from those with
the pooled sample in order to take advantage of the panel structure. Any participant who
moved to another state was dropped from the regressions. In general, the results are similar
to the results using all the panels, but less significant; this is likely due to the smaller sample
size. In the aggregate, there is some evidence that the reform may have helped curb rising
costs. As can be seen in Table I.4, average changes in cost from 2008 to 2009 in MA were
smaller than those in the control states with many participants in MA having decreasing
costs.
As with the results above from the pooled sample, the first three columns are results for
the 28 decoded states that remain after removing MN. The first column is all the participants,
the second just those over 65. The third are only those insured through their employer. The
fourth through sixth columns report results using just CA, CT, NJ and VA as a control, and
repeat the groupings. The first half of tables reports estimates using the survey commands
and clustering on strata and primary sampling unit, the second half reports estimates when
the survey commands are abandoned to cluster by states, As with the pooled data, estimates
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of standard errors are smaller when clustering by states, as similarities within a strata are
greater than those within a state.
Tables I.12 and I.13 report average marginal effects from probit regressions. Table I.12
reports the likelihood of starting a BMIGC in 2009. The regression includes participants
not taking a BMIGC in 2008; the dependent variable takes the value 1 if they are taking a
BMIGC in 2009, and 0 otherwise. Table I.13 is the complement, the likelihood that use of
a BMIGC is discontinued. It includes participants taking a BMIGC in 2008; the dependent
variable takes the value 1 if they are no longer taking a BMIGC in 2009, and 0 otherwise.
None of the coefficient estimates are significant when using the survey commands. However
the estimate in the first column is consistent with the estimate from Table I.5. The most
likely explanation be that this would be due to the reduction in sample size. When clustering
by state, some of the results are significant. Using the 28 state control, participants who are
insured through their employer are less likely to start taking a BMIGC after the reform. All
groups regardless of the control states are more likely to discontinue use of a BMIGC after
the reform. Both these results are consistent with the pooled sample estimates.10
10These tables can be compared in the sense that we can ask: are they telling the same story? It is not
expected that the estimates would be equal or within a margin of error.
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Table I.12: Probit Estimates for Starting BMIGC in 2009
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.002 0.028 -0.030 0.006 0.020 -0.022
(0.026) (0.120) (0.040) (0.025) (0.126) (0.036)
Sub-Pop Obs. 13,745 1,007 5,829 4,068 261 1,825
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Massachusetts 0.002 0.028* -0.030*** 0.006 -0.022
(0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 13,745 1,007 5,829 4,068 1,825
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.13: Probit Estimates for Ending BMIGC in 2008
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.086 0.140 0.086 0.127
(0.000) (0.100) (0.097) (0.110)
Sub-Pop Obs. 1,685 828 380 182
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.086*** 0.140*** 0.086*** 0.127***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1,685 828 380 182
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tables I.16 and I.17 report marginal effects from probit regressions. Table I.16 reports
the likelihood of starting “substitute” medication, a generic medication in the same class as
a BMIGC, in 2009. The regression includes participants not taking a substitute in 2008; the
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dependent variable takes the value 1 if they are taking a substitute in 2009, and 0 otherwise.
Table I.17 is the complement, the likelihood that use of a substitute is discontinued. It
includes participants taking a substitute in 2008; the dependent variable takes the value 1 if
they are no longer taking a substitute in 2009, and 0 otherwise. In the general population,
relative to either control participants are significantly more likely to start a substitute after
the regulation, regardless of method for calculating errors.
Table I.14: Probit Estimates for Starting Medication in 2009
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Massachusetts -0.071**
(0.034)
Sub-Pop Obs. 6,551
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.071*** -0.191*** -0.052*** -0.162***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 6,551 143 2,480 2,088 49 836
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table I.15: Probit Estimates for Ending Medication in 2008
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.058***
(0.022)
Sub-Pop Obs. 8,879
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.058*** 0.031*** -0.022** -0.069*** 0.035*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.018) (0.002) (0.010)
Observations 8,879 1,342 4,177 2,360 335 1,171
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.16: Probit Estimates for Starting “Substitute” in 2009
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.033** 0.025 -0.000 0.039** 0.032 -0.005
(0.016) (0.095) (0.033) (0.017) (0.100) (0.035)
Sub-Pop Obs. 13,914 1,008 5,952 4,076 275 1,807
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.033*** 0.025 -0.000 0.039*** -0.005
(0.005) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014)
Observations 13,914 1,008 5,952 4,076 1,807
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table I.17: Probit Estimates for Ending “Substitute” in 2008
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.058 0.044 -0.064 -0.041 0.065 -0.037
(0.000) (0.120) (0.097) (0.064) (0.114) (0.097)
Sub-Pop Obs. 1,516 479 705 372 111 200
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.058*** 0.044** -0.064*** -0.041 -0.037
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 1,516 479 705 372 200
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
None of the results are statistically significant when standard errors are estimated using
survey commands. However, when errors are clustered by state the overall population and
those with employer-based insurance are also less likely to discontinue a substitute medica-
tion, relative to the larger control. This result is only statistically significantly in comparison
to the larger control, but the signs match for the smaller control. These findings contradict
results for the pooled sample, reported in the bottom of Table I.5. In contrast to the pooled
sample results, the panel estimates excepting those for seniors are in line with the expected
effects of the reform and provide evidence of the scenario where there is substitution from
BMIGCs to generics in the same class. While the pooled sample is larger and over a longer
span, the panel has the advantage of being free from any effects of who is randomly selected
into the sample for a given panel, so may provide more accurate results.
The panel structure allowed for the identification of participants that had been taking
a BMIGC in 2008 and where not taking one in 2009. Unfortunately, within MA, this is a
very small number of people (17), thus doesn’t constitute and sample nor allow for a formal
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analysis. However examining these specific cases allows further opportunity to distinguish
between the three scenarios, helping characterize some of changes we are seeing in the actual
sample. Of those participants on a BMIGC in 2008, in 2009 40% of them in MA were no
longer on a BMIGC in 2009 while in the control only 24% had stopped taking a BMIGC.
The existence of these participants in higher proportion than in the control indicates the
regulation some change, so there are participants who were not represented by the first sce-
nario. There were 17 participants in MA for whom this was the case. One participant was
taking two BGMIC in 2009, so there were a total of 18 cases of BMIGCs being discontinued.
Table I.18 reports the categorization of these changes, based upon a case by case inspection.
Table I.18: Categorization of MA participants on a BMIGC in 2008 but not in 2009
On generic med in same class as BMIGC in 2009 2
On generic med in same class as BMIGC in 2008 and 2009 2
On branded med in same class as BMIGC in 2009 2
On branded med in same class as BMIGC in 2008 and 2009 4 a
On no med in same class as BIMGC in 2009 8 b
a In 1 case, the participant was on three meds in the same class in 2008 a
BMIGC and two branded meds (both available generically) but was only one
of these and not the BMIGC in 2009.
b In 3 cases, the participant was on both a BMIGC and a generic med in the
same class for it in 2008, but no longer on that med nor the BMIGC in 2009.
MEPS does not provide exact dates for medications only years, which hampers analysis.
In the control there is some discontinuation of BMIGCs so we cannot attribute all of the
change to the regulation, nor distinguish those which are due to the regulation from those
which are not. This table also does not capture cases where the participant was not on any
medication and then started a medication, and there was then a choice between a BMIGC
and a generic med.
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Those points aside, the first row of the table represents the scenario in which the patient
switches from a BMIGC to an in class generic; there are two cases of this. There are also two
cases of switching to another branded medication, which was not one of the scenarios and
may not be an impact of the regulation; this is the third line. The second line and fourth
lines are the cases in which the BMIGC was a supplement to another medication, a generic
in line two and another branded medication in line four. There are two and four cases of this,
respectfully. I did not examine these data for evidence of switching to non-pharmaceutical
treatments. The final line would capture the non-pharmaceutical treatments, as well as
the cases where there is no treatment in the counterfactual. There are eight cases of this.
As the footnote states in three cases, the participant quit both a BMIGC and an in-class
generic. These discontinuations may be unrelated to the regulation or they may be an affect
of removing the spillover effect from promotion of the BMIGC. This was addressed when
discussing the negative coefficient on the regulation in the regressions for the likelihood of
taking a substitute medication). A more thorough investigation could be done. I focused on
people who were on a BMIGC in 2009 but not in 2008. This does not capture the people
who were on multiple BMIGCs but reduced the number they were on between the years, or
came off one BMIGC but started another one for a separate condition.
Table I.19 reports average marginal effects for the differences from 2008 to 2009 of the
natural logs of pharmaceutical costs. When using standard error estimates from the survey
commands, the regression that appears significant is for the one for participants who are 65
years or older and when comparing MA to CA, CT, NJ and VA. This is evidence that the
restriction actually increased expenses. However this is the only evidence of it, and this is
a very small sample, and may have also arisen by chance given the number of regressions.
There is no table in the larger data set directly comparable to this one, because there are
not observations for most the participants both before and after the regulation takes effect.
When clustering errors by state results indicate that after the regulation took effect expenses
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for seniors rose relative to either control. Again this may be due to the small sample; it is
unclear why the the regulation would effect subgroups differently. In contrast, the results
for those insured by through their employer and the overall population indicate a decrease
in spending after the regulation. The latter results, indicate net saving in medication costs
despite the possible rise in costs for seniors.
Table I.19: Estimates for Logged Change in Pharmaceutical Costs
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.085 0.418 -0.195 -0.107 0.566* -0.234
(0.112) (0.289) (0.149) (0.120) (0.298) (0.152)
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0.000 0.026 0.033 0.002
Sub-Pop Obs. 6,939 1,299 3,329 1,799 325 912
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.085*** 0.418*** -0.195*** -0.107 0.566*** -0.234
(0.016) (0.060) (0.030) (0.055) (0.048) (0.113)
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0.000 0.026 0.033 0.002
Observations 6,939 1,299 3,329 1,799 325 912
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Not only is there evidence of savings on medication cost, the results in Table I.20 indicate
a decrease in overall medical cost after the regulation. None of the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant using the standard errors from the survey commands but all are significant
when clustering errors by state. The table reports the coefficient estimates on the difference
of the natural logs of expenses between the years. The results are consistent with those from
the pooled sample and indicate any increase in costs due substitute from pharmaceuticals
to other medical care was dominated by decreases in cost due to the regulation impact on
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other medical manufactures.
Table I.20: Estimates for Logged Change in Medical Costs
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.128 -0.219 -0.162 -0.106 -0.156 -0.196
(0.122) (0.284) (0.196) (0.127) (0.301) (0.202)
Sub-Pop Obs. 10,932 1,389 5,260 3,005 352 1,528
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.128*** -0.219*** -0.162*** -0.106** -0.156** -0.196**
(0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032) (0.049) (0.045)
Observations 10,932 1,389 5,260 3,005 352 1,528
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tables I.21 and I.22 report coefficients of ordered probit regressions on the difference
between 2009 and 2008 in how participants rated their physical and mental health. Lower
ratings indicate better health, so negative differences (Rating2009 −Rating2008) indicate im-
provements. For example, if the participant rated health 2 “very good” in 2008 and 1
“excellent” in 2009 the dependent variable is 1 − 2 = −1. Negative estimates of the coeffi-
cients therefore also indicate improvement. When using standard error estimates from the
survey commands, all the estimates are for changes in physical health ratings (Table I.10)
are negative but only those for those insured through their employer are significant. This is
true both when using 27 and 4 states as a control (column 4 and 6). Using standard error
estimates from clustering errors by state, all the results are significant. For mental health,
when standard error estimates from the survey commands are used, the only estimate that is
significant is Column 1; all participants with 27 states as a control. The estimates for those
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with employer and insurance and the smaller control group are very similar in value only
the standard errors are larger. When clustering errors by state, the estimate for the overall
population and those insured through their employer are significant and negative. These
results from both tables indicate that the regulation may actually improve patients health
rating, or that the use of off-site meals may have led to patients being prescribed drugs that
were worse treatments for them. These results are consistent with results from the pooled
sample (Tables I.9 and I.10) but more results significant for the panel. It is possible that the
first difference approach attenuated the impact of unobservable characteristics and allowed
for more precise results.
Table I.21: Ordered Probit Estimates for Changes in Rating of Physical Health
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.084 -0.125 -0.199* -0.097 -0.068 -0.219**
(0.080) (0.206) (0.108) (0.081) (0.230) (0.110)
Sub-Pop Obs. 15,053 1,416 6,570 4,330 365 1,978
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.084*** -0.125*** -0.199*** -0.097*** -0.068 -0.219***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.019) (0.011) (0.061) (0.020)
Observations 15,053 1,416 6,570 4,330 365 1,978
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table I.22: Ordered Probit Estimates for Changes in Rating of Mental Health
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Massachusetts -0.141* 0.029 -0.137 -0.125 0.068 -0.135
(0.077) (0.188) (0.091) (0.076) (0.203) (0.089)
Sub-Pop Obs. 15,049 1,415 6,568 4,329 365 1,977
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.141*** 0.029 -0.137*** -0.125*** 0.068 -0.135***
(0.016) (0.037) (0.013) (0.013) (0.118) (0.013)
Observations 15,049 1,415 6,568 4,329 365 1,977
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.23 reports average marginal effects from a probit regression meant to capture
the regulation impact on the probability a participant becomes less limited by his or her
health. Only those who reported a limitation in 2008 are included in the regression. The
dependent variable is coded 1 if the participant does not report a limitation in 2009, and
0 otherwise; positive coefficients indicate improvement. If standard error estimate for the
survey commands are used, none of the results are significant. If standard error estimates
from clustering by state are used, results indicate the reform may have had health costs.
There are significant negative coefficients for the general population relative to both controls
and the seniors relative to the larger control group. The estimates from this table and the
following table can be compared to those in Table I.11. However because these are estimates
of the likelihood that a participant overcame a previous limitation rather than reported a
limitation, the sign of the estimate should reverse. The estimates conflict with those from
the pooled sample. The within participant comparison may improved the precision of the
estimates, but only include a small number of participants.
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Table I.23: Probit Estimates for Participant Became Less Limited
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.119 -0.085 -0.063 -0.133 -0.074 -0.169
(0.000) (0.095) (0.176) (0.085) (0.124) (0.190)
Sub-Pop Obs. 941 290 200 218 64 53
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts -0.119*** -0.085** -0.063 -0.133*** -0.074 -0.169
(0.021) (0.039) (0.055) (0.024) (0.086) (0.143)
Sub-Pop Obs. 941 290 200 218 64 53
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table I.24 is the complement to the previous table. It reports average marginal effects
from a probit regression meant to capture the regulation impact on the probability a partic-
ipant becomes more limited by his or her health. Only those who did not report a limitation
in 2008 are included in the regression. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the participant
reports a limitation in 2009, and 0 otherwise. Negative coefficients are the desirable direc-
tion. None of the estimates are significant, when using standard error estimates from the
survey commands. When error estimates from clustering errors by state, seniors are better
off compared to the larger control after the regulation, but the general population is slightly
worse of compared to the smaller control. The former is consistent with the estimates in
Table I.11, while the latter conflicts them.
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Table I.24: Probit Estimates for Participant Became More Limited
Estimates using Survey Command
28 States 5 States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Massachusetts 0.002 -0.056 0.002 0.004 -0.017 0.004
(0.015) (0.119) (0.007) (0.015) (0.098) (0.008)
Sub-Pop Obs. 12,781 1,126 5,953 3,727 301 1,786
Estimates when Clustering by State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd All 65+ Empr Insrd
Massachusetts 0.002 -0.056*** 0.002 0.004** -0.017 0.004
(0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.025) (0.005)
Sub-Pop Obs. 12,781 1,126 5,953 3,727 301 1,786
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I.5 Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of MA regulation which prohibited pharmaceutical
manufactures from providing off-site meals to doctors and other licensed prescribers. It
was expected that this would have the greatest impact of branded medications with only
indirect generic competition (BMIGC) – medications which had patent protection from direct
generic competition, but were in the same class as medications which no longer had patent
protection.
In the Introduction, four scenarios were laid out. The first scenario was that the regula-
tion might have no effect. Probit and linear probability regressions show that participants in
MA were less likely to be taking these medications, after the regulation, so for at least some
participants the regulation had an effect. Additionally, there is indication that it reduced
overall medication expense. The remaining three scenarios differ in what treatment was re-
ceived in place of the BMIGCs. The second scenario was that there was substitution toward
generics. In the pooled sample, there is little evidence that this was the case. Results imply
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that the substitute generics were less likely to be prescribed, and that participants were less
likely to any medications. These decreases are possibly due to the marketing having spillover
effects to other medications. There is some evidence that there were substitutions toward
generics in the panel sample, however there was also instances of participants quiting both
a BMIGC and another in-class medication, including generics.
There was also no evidence of the third scenario – substitution toward other medical care.
Results indicated individuals were less likely to have any medical costs after the regulation.
There was some indication that cost conditional on have any cost did rise, but this may be
a lingering effect of RomneyCare, and was likely dominated by the decreased probability of
having any costs. The lack of evidence may be due to the regulation also effecting manu-
factures of other medical devices and products, so that there was substitution toward other
care, but it was dominated by the overall decrease in medical expenses. This implies that it
was the final scenario the BMIGC were in place of nothing. This scenario had two variants;
one was that the BMIGC was being used to supplement another medication, and that some
other medication would be used by the individual with or without the marketing. The other
is the medication was the only medication for the condition, and that without the market
the individual would not take any medication for the condition. In the panel sample there
were some instances of both variants in roughly equal proportions.
The paper also examined potential negative impacts of the regulation, and lack of treat-
ment. It appears that people rated their health better after the regulation and were less
likely to report health limitations to daily activities. The analysis was limited by a relatively
small dataset that is not a true panel. I was unable to produce a synthetic control. Addi-
tionally, I may not have been able to truly isolate the effects of the regulation from those of
the Massachusetts Health Care Reform (RomneyCare).
Beyond showing that this regulation decreased the likelihood of taking a more expen-
sive medication than was necessary, and that if anything the cheaper treatment (or lack of
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treatment) improved patient outcomes, this paper shows that in general there is potential
cost savings, without harming patients in an array of policies dissuading the prescribing of
BMIGCs. This result holds regardless of identification. Perhaps it was not the regulation
that accomplished this, but instead some delayed effect of RomneyCare. If this were the
case then marketing regulation may not be the answer to reducing cost, but the finding that
reducing the number of prescriptions for BMIGCs can cut cost without negative impacts on
health still stands. This might be accomplished via insurer polices, such as prior authoriza-
tions or tiering of medications, or provider policies, such as hospital or clinic formularies, or
other restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing.
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Chapter II
When the Novelty Wears Out:
The Impact of Revealing the Intent to Nudge on Real Effort
II.1 Introduction
Behavioral nudges are being employed in myriad applications, including loss framed in-
terventions in environment and health. For example: in order to cut down on waste and
pollution, many stores encourage customers to use their own bags, by refunding customers
a nickel or a dime per bag they bring. Studies have shown that charging the same amount
for every bag distributed is much more effective (Convery et al., 2007; Jakovcevic et al.,
2014). Similarly, health insurers experiment with penalizing unhealthy actions (e.g. failure
to exercise, smoking) instead of rewarding healthy behaviors (e.g. exercising, not smoking).
While proponents of nudges have touted early successes as a signal of their power, they admit
nudges work best in novel situations (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Focusing on a particular
nudge, we simulate what is likely to happen as programs that use loss framing are more
widely employed, draw media attention, and become more familiar and less novel: people
in the programs are likely to catch on to the fact that the program is using loss framing to
manipulate their behavior.
44
Loss framing is closely related to the theory of loss aversion, which holds that “losses loom
larger than gains.” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279) Loss framing builds on the idea
that people would work harder to avoid losses than to achieve gains. Loss framing structures
payments so that there is the danger that the subject (worker) might incur what (s)he regards
as a loss or a penalty in hope of incentivizing greater effort and higher performance.
While this ‘nudge’ is attractive in theory, loss framed contracts are relatively rare outside
of experiments in motivation. It is much more traditional that workers have the potential to
earn a gain or a payment. The precise reason for this is yet to be explored; a possibility is
that there is reluctance to label people as low performers (Baker et al., 1988), and perhaps a
further hesitation to penalize. Peoples’ preferences for framing and being nudged are not well
understood either. Furthermore, while nudges may be effective, a growing literature suggests
that nudges have utility costs that can make subjects less well off (DellaVigna et al., 2012;
Allcott and Kessler, 2015). To shed light on people’s preference for potentially performance-
enhancing but psychologically costly nudges, we ask subjects in our lab experiment if they
want to receive the nudge, and test its impact when the nudgee has willingly selected it. Our
results provide insight into how these nudges will be received, and how effective they will be
as their usage becomes more common.
I conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects work on a real effort task and are
paid according to the number of items completed within the time limit. My design is a
combination of a within subject and a between subject framework: the extra effort loss
framing induces relative to gain framing is measured within-subject, while the impact of
the subjects’ awareness of the nudge on the framing effect is measured between-subjects. In
particular, payments for all subjects are gain framed for one period, and loss framed from an
advance payment for another. For a final period, subjects are asked which frame they would
prefer and given this choice with 2/3 probability. I randomly assign sessions to treatment
or control conditions such that half of our subjects are made aware of the loss framing and
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its typical effects. I test whether providing this information affects subjects’ response to the
loss framing.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper in which subjects are forewarned of likely impacts
of loss framing. A handful of other papers (discussed in more detail in Section II.2) test the
impact of making subjects aware of other types of nudges (Gunnlaugsson, 2014; Loewenstein
et al., 2014; Steffel et al., 2015; Kurz et al., 2005). It is also the first to our knowledge to
offer subjects their choice of framing. In related studies Imas et al. (2014) and De Quidt
(2014) both infer preferences for frames by comparing relative rates of opting for a period of
gain or loss frame, but neither offer subjects a direct choice between the two.
The results confirm the importance of awareness for the effectiveness of loss framing
nudges. In the control group, I confirm framing effects found in many earlier experiments and
show that loss framing leads to higher performance through increased effort. The treatment,
informing subjects that they are being nudged, extinguishes the effect. These findings suggest
that as loss framing becomes more widely employed, and people become more familiar with
it, it could become less effective. By extension this suggests that other nudges may also lose
their power if applied more widely, and that nudges may not be the policy panacea that
initial studies suggest.
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Table II.1: Laboratory Experiment Findings
Author(s) Year Task Effect Effect Size N Comment Summary
p < 0.05
Luft 1994 “General business
knowledge” multiple
choice questions
N Students seemed to
know or not know an-
swers
LF ineffective when
subjects cannot do
task.
Frederickson
and Waller
2005 Stated effort Y Employers could of-
fer bonus or penal-
ties based on state of
world.
Workers required
higher expected
payments to accept
LF
Church et al. 2008 Translating symbols Y* not clear 68 Kinks in payments, ef-
fect found only for Ss
near kinks
LF effective for those
not having baseline
performances in flat
area.
Brooks et al. 2011 Stated effort:
“leasing machine”
Y
Goldsmith
and Dhar
2011 Anagrams Y 1.6(time) 62 Basically no effect for
words
In experiment 1A,
LF worked longer
trying to solve to
“unsolvable” words.
Y 1.4(words) 92 Exp. 1B, found more
words
40 Subjects (incor-
rectly) predict more
time and more word
in GF
Exp. 2
47 Knowing both con-
ditions predict enjoy
GF more
Exp. 3A
130 Those in GF predict
being more moti-
vated and enjoy
working more
Exp. 3B
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138 Treatment: varied of
sample task, easy vs.
hard
Exp. 4, those given
hard words more ac-
curate prediction.
Dolan et al. 2012 Sliders N Procedures unclear.
Endogenous stop-
ping (max. = 20
rounds) only out-
come reported is
total sliders
Coefficient on LF not
sig.
Armantier
and Boly
2012 Grading dictations Y 1.038 131 (Framed field exp.)
Mixed frame even
better than LF
1.141(time)
Y 1.046 228 student subjects 1.126(time)
Imas et al. 2014 Sliders Y 1.285 62 Higher WTP for LF LF moved more slid-
ers.
Y 1.19(WTP) 60
De Quidt 2014 Transcribe blurry
text
Y 25% accept
3.6% accuracy
1450 Bonus/Penalties not
for
quantities, but for ac-
curacy audit
LF higher acceptance
and more accurate.
Brooks
et al.
2014 Counting: 200 digits 1-9 Y 1.375 194 Also had very high ref-
erence point (ineffec-
tive)
LF preferred (lower
rejection rate) and
more productive.
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II.2 Literature
Experiments in both the lab and the field generally confirm that initially subjects work-
ing in a loss frame (LF) are more productive than those working in a gain frame (GF). Table
II.1 summarizes laboratory experiments testing loss framing’s effect on effort. Most of these
studies offer evidence in favor of the effectiveness of loss framing at motivating subjects.
However, loss framing may be ineffective or even discouraging when the goal is unattain-
able (Brooks et al., 2014). Furthermore it may depend upon context; higher motivation is
sufficient to improve performance in effort tasks, but in tasks requiring special knowledge
to succeed a loss frame may not induce better performance (Luft, 1994) despite increased
effort (Goldsmith and Dhar, 2011). While the majority of evidence in this area comes from
the lab, there are a handful of studies such as List and Samek (2015) and Hossain and List
(2012) who successfully apply loss framing in the field.
There are two contemporaneous papers by Imas et al. (2014) and De Quidt (2014) ad-
dressing the question of selection into loss framed incentive schemes. Both of these studies
infer preferences for frames by cross-subject comparison, the former through soliciting a
WTP price and latter by comparing relative rates of selecting into a contract. As stated
above, neither offer subjects a direct choice between the two frames. More importantly,
neither of the two studies study the question of informing subjects of the typical effects of
framing.
To our knowledge ours is the first paper in which subjects are forewarned of likely im-
pacts of loss framing. A handful of other papers test the impact of making subjects aware
of other nudges for defaults. Gunnlaugsson (2014) and Kroese et al. (2015) test the impact
of informing subjects of a default nudge to select healthy food; the latter find the nudge
is still effective in the presence of information. Loewenstein et al. (2014) test the impact
of pre-informing subjects of a default nudge in hypothetical end of life directives, and find
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pre-informing can impact responses depending upon the default and intervention. Steffel
et al. (2015) test defaults in a variety of settings and finds they remain effective in many set-
tings, but that green (pro-social) defaults are more robust to disclosure than default toward
premium amenities. Bruns et al. (2016) find awareness does not impact the effectiveness of
a default on the decision to purchase and retire a carbon credit. Isoni et al. (2017) con-
ducted three experiments testing the impact of awareness on defaults in decisions regarding
lotteries. In the first, subjects were paid a flat fee, and the defaults remained effective even
with information. In the second and third, there was no default effect. Kurz et al. (2005)
attempted to test the effect of information on social comparisons of utility usage, but also
failed to get a treatment effect from uninformed social comparisons.
Epley and Gilovich (2005) find that informing subjects about anchors diminishes the
effect of an anchor only when the question guides the subject to create their own anchor e.g.
“In what year was George Washington elected President of the United States?”, but has no
impact when the anchor is provided. Wilson et al. (1996) provide anchors to subjects and
also find that awareness of the anchor does not diminish the effect.
My paper further contributes to the literature by addressing the criticism of real effort
tasks raised by Ga¨chter et al. (2015). Specifically, that when laboratory subjects lack an
alternative to the effort task, data can be unreliable. Per their suggestion, I offer subjects
paid breaks in combination with a real effort task used in Eckartz (2014). The task is
described in the next section. This way I can distinguish between the effect of our treatment
on motivation and quality of work.
II.3 Experimental Design
The experiment combines elements of a within-subject and a between-subject design. An
overview of the design is shown in the diagram of Figure II.1. I compare a treatment group
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(subjects who are given information about the typical effect of loss framing) to a control
group. This between-subject comparison of the framing effect is used to identify the impact
of awareness. The framing effect is calculated within-subjects by varying by period the
framing of payments, and is the difference between productivity in the loss and gain frames,
corrected for period effects.
Figure II.1: Experimental Design
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The experiment consisted of one practice period, followed by three paid periods. The
practice period allowed subjects to become familiar with the task. In the three paid periods
subjects experienced both frames and then made an informed choice for the final round. All
periods were four minutes long. I anticipated improvements across periods, so used LF, GF,
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Choice and GF, LF, Choice design within each treatment. Order was fixed by session so as
not to reveal the upcoming frame to subjects in the control treatment as it could have a
similar effect to information.1
During the treatment sessions, after the practice period, subjects were informed that in
previous experiments people on average work harder when payments are loss framed, but
that this was not true for all subjects. It was also made clear that the payments were
equivalent so there should be no difference in expected earnings for the same performance.
A written statement (included in appendix C) was distributed and read aloud. The session
then proceeded identically to the control sessions.
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The effort task
was one used by Eckartz (2014) and can be seen in Figure II.2. Subjects are presented with 25
digits in a 5 x 5 grid; each digit is either randomly determined and “0” or “1”. The subjects’
task is to correctly count the number of “1”s, type that number into a box on the screen,
and click the “OK” button using the mouse. If the subject enters the correct number, the
word “Correct” appeared in green at the top of the screen, the number of correctly answered
grids displayed to the right of the grid increases by one and the grid immediately refreshes.
If the subject was incorrect the word “Incorrect” appeared in red at the top of the screen
and the subject remained on that grid until the correct number was entered. The task is
tedious, and was chosen to minimize intrinsic motivation among subjects.
Concerned with the issues of whether effort tasks actually measure effort when subjects
lack another option or enjoy the task, raised by Ga¨chter et al. (2015), I chose a task that
provided an outside option and that, with this addition, had been demonstrated to show
1While it would have been possible to vary the frame order by subject in the aware treatment, I didn’t
want any variation across the conditions, aside from the awareness statement. I made the decision to
randomize treatment by session to allow for the awareness statement to be read aloud, ensuring all the
subjects understood the statement. There was also concern that there was the possibility of contamination
across treatments if I were to assign only some subjects in a sessions to treatment, and then one of these
subjects asked a question about the statement or commented about the statement to another subject.
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Figure II.2: Screen shot of effort task
variation across payment schemes (Eckartz, 2014). Subjects could opt to take a paid break
by pushing a button at the bottom of the screen, as shown in Figure II.2. The break lasted
20 seconds and subjects would receive 30¢ for each break.2 The grid, entry box, and OK
button disappeared from the screen for the duration of the break, so that subjects could not
work on the task while they were on break. Subjects could take as many breaks as they
wanted. The break length and payments amounts were chosen to ease cash payments and so
that taking a break was about a third to a half as profitable as I anticipated working to be.
For the gain framed periods subjects were paid 25¢ for each correct grid (up to 100) at
the end of the period. For the loss frame period subjects were paid $25.00 at the beginning of
the period, and told that unless they correctly counted 100 grids, then for each grid they were
short of 100, 25¢ would be collected from them at the end of the period. Immediate cash
payments were used in the experiment to increase saliency and out of concern subjects may
react differently to paper loss than to realized losses (Imas, 2016). The prepaying amount of
2The button disappeared when there were fewer than 20 seconds left in the period.
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100 grids was chosen to ensure no subject entered a mixed frame3 (receive a payment rather
than a penalty because they completed more grids than they were prepaid for) and for easy
and transparent math.
For the third period, subjects were asked which frame they preferred with the under-
standing that they would be given this choice with a 2/3 probability.
4 Not all subjects were
given their choice, so that I could distinguish the effect of choice from that of learning be-
tween periods two and three.5 Subjects were also allowed to enter no preference, in which
case they were randomly assigned a frame. The subjects assigned loss frame for that period
were given a prepayment as above and the period commenced.
The design allows us to answer the following research questions:
1. Does loss framing affect performance overall (i.e. is the number of correct grids higher)?
(a) Is this effect attributable to increased effort (i.e. fewer breaks)?
(b) Is this effect attributable to higher quality work (i.e. fewer mistakes)?
(c) Is there side effect of stress (i.e. more mistakes)?
2. Does awareness reduce the positive impact of LF on performance?
(a) Does this manifest through lower motivation (i.e. more breaks)?
(b) Does this manifest through lower quality work (i.e. more mistakes)?
3In this experiment, I am only interested in testing λ the factor which weights losses relative to gains was
greater than 1, and if λ was closer to 1 for subjects in the “aware” treatment. Had I wanted to estimate λ
for individual subjects mixed frames would have been necessary.
4After subjects made their selections each was assigned a color in a message displayed on their computer
screen. There were three possible colors. 12 ping pong balls (four of each color) were placed in a bingo cage.
A subject volunteer was selected to turn the crank of the cage releasing a random from the cage. The color
of the drawn ball is entered in the computer. The subjects whose color was chosen do not get their preferred
frame. The other subjects get their preferred frame.
5This assumes that being asked one’s choice and not getting it has the same effects on productivity as
being randomly assigned a frame. Not making this assumption would require creating a treatment where
the subjects were randomly assigned a frame in the third round, and not asking their preference. Having
choices from all the subjects seemed more important.
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(c) Does it mitigate any effects of stress (i.e. fewer mistakes)?
3. Are gain frames more popular?
(a) Does awareness of LF affect its popularity?
(b) Do subjects who perform better under LF prefer LF more?
II.4 Context and Data
The sessions were conducted in the ExCen laboratory at Georgia State University in the
between the summers of 2016 and 2017 and lasted between 60 and 75 minutes. Subjects
earned $23.50 on average. In total 548 undergraduate students participated in our experi-
ment. Two sessions (16 subjects) were dropped, because of deviations from the experimental
protocol.6 Additionally, three subjects were excluded, because they did not participate in
one of the periods.7 Table II.2 reports the cell distribution for the remaining 529 subjects.
Table II.2: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects
Starting Frame
Treatment Gain Frame Loss Frame Total
Unaware 135 133 268
Aware 128 133 261
Total 263 266 529
Table II.3 reports on the demographic characteristics of the subjects by treatment group.
The two groups are balanced along gender, age, race and citizenship.
6The sessions were run with fewer lab personnel than protocol.
7One subject’s computer froze. A second subjects didn’t understand the task, but did not state this
during the practice round. A third subject didn’t realize the round started.
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Table II.3: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects
Unaware Aware
Variable Mean SD Mean SD p
Female .57 (.5) .64 (.48) .11
Age 20.92 (3.56) 20.7 (2.53) .42
Hispanic .07 (.26) .04 (.2) .15
Asian .15 (.36) .18 (.38) .4
White .08 (.28) .07 (.25) .57
African American .57 (.5) .56 (.5) .86
US Citizen .91 (.29) .92 (.27) .59
II.5 Results
II.5.1 General Review of Task Performance
Table II.4 reports summary statistics for the outcome variables in the paid periods.
Figure II.3 shows the distribution of the grids completed. Figure II.3a shows only the first
two periods. Figure II.3b shows all three. In Figure II.3a, there is substantial overlap of
performance in period 1 and period 2. Purple indicates observations from both periods.
Blue indicates only first period observations and is to the left. Red indicates only second
period observations and is to the right. The presentation is similar but more complicated
in Figure II.3a. However period 3 observations are to the right of those of period 2. As
expected, subjects became more productive in subsequent periods. Period effects are thus
included in the analysis. Large variation between subjects is observed in task performance,
a consideration that leads us to estimate models with individual effects. Figures D.1 and
D.2 in appendix D provide histograms of the number of breaks taken and number of errors
made, respectively. Each has sub-figures graphing by period and frame. It can be seen that
there are very few breaks taken, but that they decrease in later periods and that they occur
more frequently in the gain frame. In contrast errors increase in the later periods and there
is no clear relationship to frame.
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Figure II.3: Grids Completed
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Table II.4 offers summary statistics of Grids Correct as well as our two other outcomes
of interest, Breaks Taken and Errors Made. Participants on average solved approximately
31 grids correctly in a period, with a standard deviation of 7.26. While the option to take a
break was on average unpopular (the mean number of breaks taken is only 0.18), there was
large variation among participants: one subjects opted for a break 11 times. Subjects on
average made few errors: the mean number of incorrect grids was 3.49 per period.
Table II.4: Summary Statistics for Outcome Variables
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Grids Correct 1587 31.11 (7.26) 0 56
Breaks Taken 1587 .18 (.72) 0 11
Errors Made 1554 3.49 (3.53) 0 32
II.5.2 The Effect of Loss Framing and Awareness on Productivity
The number of correct counted grids is our outcome of primary interest. Figure II.4
illustrates how this number varies by frame and treatment. The difference is slight but goes
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in the expected direction: loss framing seems to improve performance, but only when subjects
are unaware. Unpaired T-tests show the difference across frame are marginally statistically
significant in the first period (Pr(T < t) = 0.0997(Period = 1, Aware = 0)) and not
statistically significant in the second period (Pr(T < t) = 0.2181(Period = 2, Aware =
0)). Paired (within-subject) t-test of number correct show the differences across frames
are significantly different for unaware subjects (p = 0.00684), but not for aware subjects
(p = 0.2578).
Figure II.4: Grids Correct by Treatment and Frame
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Table II.5 reports means for the two frames by treatment. Again, I find suggestive
evidence that subjects in the Unaware, but not in the Aware condition, perform better
under the loss frame than under the gain frame, but given the large standard deviations,
the difference of differences is not statistically significant. Comparing means suggests that
Aware subjects may have increased effort in gain frame rather than decreasing efforts in loss
frame.
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Table II.5: Frame Means by Treatment
Unaware
Frame Obs Mean SD Min Max
Gain Frame 536 28.87 (7.18) 0 50
Loss Frame 536 29.74 (6.92) 2 48
Aware
Frame Obs Mean SD Min Max
Gain Frame 522 30.11 (7.57) 0 51
Loss Frame 522 30.32 (6.77) 11 49
Our analysis proceeds with regressions that add controls to reduce variance by exploiting
the within-subject nature of the data and controlling for individual-specific performance
characteristics. In particular, a random effects model of loss framing and awareness on the
number of correct grids solved by our subjects is estimated.8
Table II.6 presents regression results for the data from the first two periods, before choice
was a factor. All the columns present estimated coefficients from GLS random effects models,
and have errors clustered by subject to address the serial correlation in the error terms. While
the number correct is confined to non-negative values, inspection of Figure D.3 in Appendix
D indicates that the model can assume a normal distribution of errors. The first column
shows a model that estimates the overall impact of loss framing, controlling for period. Loss
framing is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and indicates that on average the framing
caused an increase of .453 correct grids in the period. The second column adds demographic
controls. The age of one subject is missing, and dropped the subject from regressions with
demographics. The third column, adds the impact of the awareness treatment. Loss framing
increases in statistical significance (p < 0.001) and increases in magnitude to 0.891 The
8Both a fixed effect model and the random effect model were estimated and a Hausman test showed there
were not significant differences between the estimates (χ2 = 0.33, P r(> χ2) = 0.9544), so the more efficient
random effects model is employed.
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coefficient for awareness interacted with loss framing is statistically significant (p < 0.5) and
essentially equal (0.887) to the coefficient on loss framing in magnitude yet opposite in sign,
indicating that the treatment of making subjects aware of loss framing effects completely
eliminated the effect – the combined effect is essential zero. The estimates of loss framing
vary across the models; in the first two columns it is a weighted average of those unaware for
which there was an effect and those who were aware and it had no effect. The fourth column
repeats the third column’s model adding demographic controls. The fifth column adds
controls for summer and its interaction with loss framing. In the third column, Awareness
was interacted with the periods to test if awareness impacted improvement across periods.
In the final two columns, the statistical significance of the estimate on loss framing drops to
(p < 0.5).
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Table II.6: Panel Regression Estimates for Correct Grids in Periods 1 & 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aware
Impact Aware Controls
Impact LF of Aware Aware Controls Summer
VARIABLES of LF Controls on LF Controls Summer Dif Learn
LossFrame 0.453** 0.454** 0.891*** 0.891*** 0.809** 0.938**
(0.224) (0.225) (0.337) (0.338) (0.401) (0.423)
Aware & Loss Framed -0.887** -0.887** -0.878** -0.896**
(0.444) (0.446) (0.445) (0.446)
Aware 1.350** 1.428** 1.421** 1.684**
(0.620) (0.607) (0.611) (0.657)
2nd Period 2.178*** 2.180*** 2.172*** 2.173*** 2.165*** 2.428***
(0.224) (0.225) (0.222) (0.224) (0.224) (0.350)
Aware & 2nd Period -0.509
(0.464)
Female -1.527*** -1.599*** -1.597*** -1.597***
(0.576) (0.580) (0.581) (0.581)
Age -0.181** -0.176* -0.175* -0.175*
(0.0901) (0.0897) (0.0910) (0.0911)
Hispanic -0.803 -0.662 -0.660 -0.660
(1.017) (1.016) (1.017) (1.017)
Asian 3.649*** 3.613*** 3.611*** 3.611***
(1.097) (1.094) (1.098) (1.099)
White 2.857** 2.911** 2.908** 2.908**
(1.310) (1.307) (1.308) (1.308)
African American -0.305 -0.272 -0.274 -0.274
(0.661) (0.659) (0.658) (0.658)
US Citizen -0.714 -0.784 -0.785 -0.785
(1.020) (1.025) (1.027) (1.028)
Summer -0.109 -0.00293
(0.616) (0.621)
Summer & Loss Framed 0.132 -0.0797
(0.440) (0.455)
Observations 1,058 1,056 1,058 1,056 1,056 1,056
Number of ID 529 528 529 528 528 528
Overall R-squared 0.0244 0.0818 0.0295 0.0875 0.0875 0.0878
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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II.5.3 The Effect of Loss Framing and Awareness on Taking Breaks
Table II.7 reports estimates of the marginal effects on the likelihood a subject chose to
take a break. The outcome is binary, where one indicates taking any break. The analysis
focuses on this binary decision because subjects took very few breaks and multiple breaks
were very rare.9 I restrict analysis to the first two periods to avoid the complications of
associated with choice. The relative few number of breaks taken may indicate that they
paid too little for the time – subjects were able to complete grids faster than I anticipated.
However, should that be the case, it would dampen treatment effects. As above, variables
are progressively added and include the same independent variables and interaction terms
as the regression for number of correctly counted grids. The results of this probit regression
indicate that a loss frame made subjects less likely to take a break and awareness removed
any impact of loss framing; as above within each model the estimates on the two coefficients
are roughly equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. There is slightly more variation across
the estimates than there was for the number correct, but the confidence intervals of all the
estimates overlap. Awareness also appears to make subjects less likely to take a break.
9In the 1058 subject-period observations, 938 have zero breaks. Of those with breaks, 81 have one break,
24 have two, 9 have three, and only 6 have four or more.
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Table II.7: Average Marginal Effects on Likelihood of Taking a Break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aware
Impact Aware Controls
Impact LF of Info Aware Controls Summer
VARIABLES of LF Controls on LF Controls Summer Dif Learn
LossFrame -0.449*** -0.440*** -0.565*** -0.565*** -0.565*** -0.694***
(0.119) (0.119) (0.167) (0.168) (0.218) (0.232)
Aware & Loss Framed 0.260 0.284 0.280 0.300
(0.232) (0.234) (0.232) (0.235)
Aware -0.355** -0.399** -0.401** -0.646***
(0.159) (0.161) (0.162) (0.222)
2nd Period 0.137 0.145 0.138 0.150 0.148 -0.0527
(0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116) (0.170)
Aware & 2nd Period 0.438*
(0.251)
Female 0.201 0.226* 0.230* 0.232*
(0.134) (0.137) (0.134) (0.136)
Age -0.00273 -0.00426 -0.00321 -0.00260
(0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0175)
Asian -0.601* -0.614* -0.632*
(0.325) (0.323) (0.326)
White -0.393 -0.418 -0.431
(0.284) (0.282) (0.286)
African American 0.0225 0.00952 0.0101
(0.153) (0.155) (0.156)
Hispanic 0.0975 0.0485 0.0473 0.0526
(0.283) (0.279) (0.277) (0.280)
US Citizen -0.00626 0.00283 0.00150 0.000612
(0.276) (0.283) (0.283) (0.287)
Summer -0.0435 -0.142
(0.162) (0.169)
Summer & Loss Framed 0.00267 0.192
(0.236) (0.257)
Observations 1,058 1,056 1,058 1,056 1,056 1,056
Log pseudolikelihood -363.5 -356.1 -361.0 -353.0 -352.9 -351.5
Number of Subjects 528 529 528 528 528
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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II.5.4 The Effect of Loss Framing and Awareness on Errors Made
Table II.8 reports coefficient estimates from Poisson regressions on the number of errors
made. Again the sample is limited to before choice was a factor, and progressively add
dependent variables. Due to a programing error this data was not collected in the first
session, so there are fewer observations. The results in column three indicate that loss
framing had no impact on the number of errors made. Errors also increased in later periods.
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Table II.8: Coefficient Estimates from Poisson Regressions on the Number of Errors Made
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aware
Aware Aware Controls
Impact LF of Info Aware Controls Summer
VARIABLES of LF Controls on LF Controls Summer Dif Learn
LossFrame 0.0142 0.0140 -0.00581 -0.00671 0.0319 0.0292
(0.0441) (0.0443) (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0836) (0.0874)
Aware & Loss Framed 0.0401 0.0414 0.0370 0.0376
(0.0885) (0.0888) (0.0889) (0.0891)
Aware -0.0362 -0.0267 -0.0266 -0.0324
(0.0970) (0.0935) (0.0938) (0.113)
2nd Period 0.330*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 0.330*** 0.334*** 0.329***
(0.0445) (0.0445) (0.0445) (0.0446) (0.0451) (0.0659)
Aware & 2nd Period 0.00971
(0.0967)
Female -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.311***
(0.0786) (0.0789) (0.0788) (0.0788)
Age -0.0147 -0.0148 -0.0148 -0.0148
(0.00916) (0.00916) (0.00941) (0.00941)
Asian -0.0810 -0.0814 -0.0818 -0.0818
(0.141) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
White -0.159 -0.159 -0.159 -0.159
(0.160) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160)
African American -0.00162 -0.00214 -0.00223 -0.00223
(0.0890) (0.0893) (0.0894) (0.0894)
Hispanic 0.0647 0.0641 0.0645 0.0645
(0.165) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166)
US Citizen 0.0229 0.0230 0.0226 0.0227
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Summer 0.0294 0.0276
(0.0952) (0.0980)
Summer & Loss Framed -0.0633 -0.0595
(0.0910) (0.0987)
Observations 1,036 1,034 1,036 1,034 1,034 1,034
Number of ID 518 517 518 517 517 517
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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II.5.5 Frame Preference
Subjects preferred the gain frame 4 to 1. This result confirms the traditional wisdom
that people prefer gain framing to loss framing and is consistent with Frederickson and
Waller (2005) and Goldsmith and Dhar (2011). It conflicts with some recent findings, direct
choice with a binding consequence, after having experienced both frames, would seem to be
a better indication of preference than the comparison of relative acceptance rates or WTP’s
used respectively by De Quidt (2014) and Imas et al. (2014). Table II.9 shows that this
preference was stronger 84% and statistically significant when subjects were Aware. ; the
result of a χ2 test was p = 0.015.
Table II.9: Preference for Frames
Preferred Frame
Treatment Gain Frame Loss Frame Total
Unaware 176 58 234
75.2% 24.8%
Aware 175 32 207
84.5% 15.5%
Total 351 90 441
79.6% 20.4%
Table II.10 reports the estimates of average marginal effects in a probit regression of the
likelihood that a subject stated a preference for loss framing. As the differences in Table
II.9 suggest, the estimate for awareness is statistically significant, indicating Aware subjects
are less likely to choice loss framing. The loss frame effect is the difference between the
loss frame period and the gain frame period. The more productive the individual believes
(s)he was under loss framing relative to gain framing the more likely (s)he is to choice loss
framing. Earning Per. 1 & 2 is the subjects individual’s earnings first two periods, and
is meant to capture individual aptitude for the task and any wealth effect at the time of
choice. The estimate for earnings effect on choice is not statistically significant once controls
are added. Additionally, the estimate for Female is statistically significant and negative,
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indicating women are less likely to opt for loss framing. Column 5 adds a variable to test if
there is an interaction between Awareness and Female; it is not statistically significant.
Table II.10: Marginal Effects on Likelihood of Choosing Loss Framing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aware *
VARIABLES Impact of Aware Controls LF effect Controls Female
Aware -0.0938** -0.0831** -0.0873** -0.0760** -0.0417
(0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0547)
LF effect 0.0204*** 0.0206*** 0.0205***
(0.00314) (0.00308) (0.00309)
Earnings Per. 1 & 2 0.00933* 0.00699 0.00698
(0.00561) (0.00571) (0.00571)
Female -0.0917** -0.0940*** -0.0690
(0.0378) (0.0356) (0.0466)
Aware * Female -0.0616
(0.0738)
Age -0.00610 -0.00250 -0.00250
(0.00727) (0.00703) (0.00703)
Asian 0.0490 0.0444 0.0445
(0.0771) (0.0733) (0.0732)
White 0.0957 0.105 0.103
(0.0798) (0.0749) (0.0750)
African American 0.101** 0.0994** 0.0942**
(0.0493) (0.0460) (0.0463)
Hispanic 0.00316 0.00901 0.00824
(0.0915) (0.0869) (0.0872)
US Citizen -0.102 -0.114* -0.110*
(0.0668) (0.0633) (0.0634)
Observations 441 440 441 440 440
Pseudo R-squared 0.0134 0.0393 0.0973 0.128 0.129
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
II.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have raised the question of how robust nudges are when subjects are
aware that they are being nudged. Specifically, I focused on loss framing using a real effort
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task in a laboratory experiment. I were able to replicate loss framing effects shown in
earlier studies: the threat of having to return money from an upfront payment also induced
higher performance in our setting. Crucially, I have shown that this effect is neutralized
by informing subjects that they are exposed to a loss framing nudge, and what the typical
effect of this nudge is. I also found that loss framing could reduce subjects’ likelihood of
taking a break. This effect was also attenuated with information. I found no impact on the
number of mistakes subjects made. Contrary to the suggestion of recent studies (Imas et al.,
2014; De Quidt, 2014), I confirmed popular wisdom that subjects prefer gain framing to loss
framing, and that this preference became stronger with information. Additionally, I found
that subjects who did better, or at least believed they did better under the framing were
more likely to choose loss framing.
The findings imply that success in early programs using loss framing to motivate subjects
may not continue or may diminish in magnitude as the framing is more widely employed.
Furthermore, familiarity’s ability to undermine the effectiveness of framing incentives as
losses may generalize to other types of nudges - a question that future research should
address.
68
Chapter III
Testing the Robustness of a Default
Nudge
III.1 Introduction
Default nudges are a simple but powerful tool widely implemented in policy settings and
in consumer decisions. In their strictest form, they specify the consequences or outcome when
a decision is not made. An example of this is Madrian and Shea’s seminal paper (2001), which
examines the decision to contribute to a 401K. The default was changed from contributing
nothing to contributing 3% of one’s pay and resulted in much higher participation in the
401K plan. More broadly, defaults are choice architecture that makes it more likely a certain
option(s) is chosen, an example is the cafeteria described in Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008), in which the healthier foods were placed in more prominent locations where they
easier to see and reach, and resulted in people making healthier meal selections. Inaction
leads to nothing being chosen; none of the items end up on anyone’s tray if that person
doesn’t make a decision and place an item on the tray. However, the arrangement makes
selection of certain items more likely.
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Employed benevolently and correctly, default nudges can help people make “better”
decisions. This assumes people that employees want to contribute to their 401K, but have
not gotten around to filling out the paperwork, and the (discounted) benefit to the employees
in the future outweighs the immediate cost of the contribution – in the end, these employees
will be happy they made the contributions. This choice architecture helps people with
choices with which they may struggle, or in which they make poor choices because they
have difficulty valuing the options or with complications like inter-temporal trade-off or
risk. Thaler and Sunstein advocate defaults as a solution to the confusing choices, e.g. for
Medicare Part D. Default nudges are also employed to encourage pro-social behavior, such
as organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003, 2004), which may not make the individual
better-off but improves outcomes for society.
A fundamental point is that a default, like any nudge, by definition, “alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any option or significantly their changing
economic incentives.” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.6) The 401K decision can be reversed
by filling out the same form that in the past employees wanting to contribute had to fill
out. From the perspective of most economists, this approach is preferable to taxing or
banning certain options because all the choices are still available without penalty. A change
in which items have a transaction cost is the only possible change in cost. Because they are
so effective without being restrictive, default nudges have been employed in various settings,
and have been effective in increasing participation in 401K plans (Madrian and Shea, 2001;
Choi et al., 2004), organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003, 2004; Abadie and Gay,
2006), and savings (Somville and Vandewalle, 2014).
Despite these successes, it is reasonable to believe that if people repeatedly encounter
default nudges, they may catch on to how these nudges typically sway their behavior and
then these nudges may become less effective. Returning to the cafeteria example, the person
could realize the that the items were placed in an attempt to influence his or her choice.
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This realization might come from observation of his or her own and others changes in choice,
or from the popularization of defaults and media attention to their implementation and
successfulness. If the person prefers the unhealthy candy bar to the healthy apple, upon
realizing the there was an attempt to influence his or her choice, he or she may learn the less
convenient location of the candy bars and adapt his or her behavior to reach to this location,
and select the candy bar despite the architecture. Experience eliminating the influence
of the default on choice would be consistent with evidence that behavioral anomalies are
ephemeral and will be driven out with incentives and by market forces, such as List (2003),
which shows how experience can eliminate the over-valuation of goods that endowment of
goods often creates.
Additionally, Bovens (2009) suggests that disclosing nudges may be a solution to the
ethical concerns1 about using a nudge, and the British House of Lords (2011) expresses
concern, that the extent to which a government intervention is covert could impact its ethical
acceptability. These concerns over ethics and robustness have prompted a number of recent
studies, reviewed in the following section, which attempt to test the impact of awareness on a
the effectiveness of a default nudge. Of these studies, the one which has drawn the greatest
attention from economist is Loewenstein et al. (2015), which tests the impact of telling
subjects they had been given a default nudge and found that the default nudge remained
effective. However, the decision they use to examine this issue was a hypothetical one.
This chapter re-examines the impact of awareness on a the effectiveness of default nudges
in a context where decision have real and salient consequences. In a laboratory experiment,
subjects are given the option to buy a carbon offset from prior earnings, a decision for which
nudges have also been shown to be effective (Aran˜a and Leo´n, 2013). In a between-subject
design we vary the default option and awareness status. Specifically, half the subjects have
1There are concern that defaults distort preferences, and also in the case of pro-social nudges that the
defaulted option does not necessarily benefit the person making the choice.
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the purchase option preselected; the other half have the do not purchase option preselected.
After subjects have made their choice, all of them are given the options of confirming their
choice or choosing again. The defaults are crossed with whether or not subjects are “Aware.”
Subjects in our Aware treatment are informed that the preselected box made it more likely
they would choose that option, compared to when neither box was preselected. Subject who
are in the Unaware (control) treatment do not get that information. While there have been
a number of other papers previous to ours, we feel our study contributes to the literature by
examining the issue in a context in which: the decision is salient, there was a default effect,
subjects make a decision using money they earned, and subjects are informed both that they
were nudged and the nudge’s likely impact. This chapter builds on the previous chapter, in
which we examined the impact of awareness on another nudge, loss framing.
We find that subjects who had the “Yes,” I want to purchase a carbon offset option pres-
elected buy offsets at a lower rate than subjects who had the “No,” I do not want to purchase
an offset option preselected. This result appears to be driven by and imbalance across the
treatments in the importance of climate protection and beliefs about the effectiveness of
carbon offsets at mitigating climate change, as measure by items in the post-experiment
questionnaire. Once these items are accounted for, the default has no effect on purchase de-
cision. There is also no evidence that receiving information about the default or the common
effects of a default had any impact on the subjects’ decisions. Only two subjects, one in each
the Aware and Unaware treatment, changed his or her choice. A total of nine subjects, six
of whom where in the Aware condition, returned to the purchase decision screen.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature, focusing on ex-
perimental procedures. The third section describes our experiment and methods of analysis.
The fourth section reports the results of the analysis, and the final section concludes.
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III.2 Literature and Theory
DellaVigna (2009) noted that large default effects are one of the most robust findings in a
decade. In addition to increasing participation in 401K plans (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi
et al., 2004), organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003, 2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006),
offsetting carbon (Aran˜a and Leo´n, 2013), and savings (Somville and Vandewalle, 2014), de-
faults have been employed in many settings, including sharing of email, billing programs, and
software installation (Goldstein et al., 2008) to guide customers toward particular options.
Edwards and List (2014) and Goswami and Urminsky (2016) find that offering suggested
donation amounts causes respondents to be more likely to give this amount and bunching
at this amount.
However, there may be limits to defaults. Lo¨fgren et al. (2012) found that the difference
between treatment groups (opt-in, opt-out, and active choice) in the rate attendees of the
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) offset their
flight with carbon credit was not statically significant. The authors conclude that defaults are
ineffective for these “experienced subjects” – they assume EAERE attendees have experience
and knowledge of defaults. Their results contrast with the default effect generally found in
other studies, and the authors claim the finding is evidence that experience can decrease the
effectiveness of nudges. However, it is not clear if it is the experience, other characteristics
of their subjects,2 the decision being nudged, or the circumstance that caused the nudge to
be ineffective.
There are several papers reporting experiments which employed a default nudge and
disclosed the existence of the nudge to (treated) subjects. Table III.1 summarizes these
experiments and their key features. We also describe the relevant details of each experiment
below. None, thus far, has found that disclosure alone has an impact on the default effect.
2Education can attenuate the impact of a nudge (Madrian and Shea, 2001), and most EAERE attendees
have attended graduate school.
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However, few use salient incentives, and of those that do, most fail to create a default effect
that then allows them to test the impact of information on the effect. Steffel et al. (2016)
find that a disclosure paired with asking subjects to make note about preferences attenuates
the impact of defaults.
Loewenstein et al. (2015) report results from an uncompensated online survey of 758
Carnegie Mellon University Alumni and New York Times readers. Subjects were asked
about preferences for hypothetical advance directives for their end of life care, which would
never be added to any medical record. The decisions regarding the directives were on two
levels. The first level was the main goal, which was either to extend life, or make the patient
more comfortable. The second level was decisions regarding specific procedures. The main
goals implied decisions about specific procedures, e.g. a feeding tube is painful but can
extend one’s life, so if a subject chose the goal of comfort over extending life, and if he or she
were consistent in his or her choices, he or she would be expected to choose not to have the
feeding tube. However, the subject’s choice in the main goal did not restrict choices about
specific procedures. The design was 2 x 2: subjects were assigned to either providing comfort
or extending life, and this set default for both the main goal (provide comfort/extend life)
and for all of the specific procedures e.g. (No/Yes) feeding tube; subjects were informed that
other subjects had received a different default before or after the first round of choices. All
subjects made a second round of choices with no default to measure “carryover”3 from the
initial default. The study found default effects for specific items but not main goals, and
that the impact of information of the default effects was not statistically significant.
Steffel et al. (2016) conduct a series of experiments, in the laboratory,4 in the field, and on
MTurk. In experiment 1a, 363 university students chose whether or not to share information
3While the authors measure carryover and offer possible explanations of what might cause it, they are
not certain as to what they are measuring.
4I classify Steffel et al. (2016)’s experiment 1a as laboratory. The authors don’t state the setting, only
that participants filled out the survey for class credit.
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on a hypothetical social networking site. Setting the default to sharing rather than not
sharing resulted in more sharing of information. Disclosing that a default was employed and
the intended effect of the default did not have a statistically significant impact on the default
effect. Subjects only received class credit for participating, and there was no actual sharing
of the information. In experiment 1b, 429 MTurk subjects were paid $0.15 for completing an
initial survey. Subjects could then complete up to ten additional surveys and be paid $0.02
cent for each additional survey. Subjects either received either opt-in or opt-out defaults
for the additional surveys. Subjects who were in the opt-out rather than opt-in condition
completed more surveys. Disclosing a default was employed did not a statistically significant
impact on the number of surveys completed.
Experiment 1c had the most salient incentives among Steffel et al.’s experiments, and
even these incentives are not very salient. Free hot chocolate was distributed in a common
area in a Midwestern university. The experimental design alternated if whipped cream
was or was not included by default.5 A sign stated whether whipped cream would or not
be included by default and the other option could be requested. The design also varied
whether a disclosure was displayed at the table. When displayed, the disclosure the stated
that the default was chosen to either encourage the subjects to be more indulgent or more
healthy. The default effect was statistically significant, but interaction with disclosure was
not statistically significant.
The remaining experiments were all conducted on MTurk, compensated at a flat rate, and
presented subjects with a list of amenities to choose from for an apartment they were renting
in a hypothetical situation. Experiment 2a had a 2 x 2 x 2 design: amenities were either green
or luxury, amenities were either opt-in or opt-out, and there was or was not disclosure of the
5Subjects actually drank the hot chocolate with or without whipped cream, so in so much as subjects
have a preference for whipped cream or not or dietary restrictions, they are incentivized to reveal their
preferences. However if subjects do not have strong preferences about whipped cream or take a ‘beggars
can’t be choosers’ attitude, then the incentives are not salient.
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default nudge. A default effect was observed on the number of amenities chosen. The impact
of disclosure on the default effect was not statistically significantly. Disclosure did lead to
fewer amenities being chosen, particularly when choosing them benefited the landlord rather
than the environment. However, this occurred regardless of default status. Experiment 2b
was very similar to 2a; the main difference was that there no luxury amenities. All the
amenities were green; the variation was whether the landlord was offering them to better the
environment or to get a tax break. Again, defaults remained effective even when they were
disclosed.
Experiment 3 did not include a non-disclosure condition. All subjects saw the disclosure;
some were also asked to make a note about their preferences. Disclosure alone did not have
a statistically significant impact default effect. However, disclosure paired with a 60-second
delay in which subjects were asked to make a note about their preferences attenuated the
impact of defaults. Experiment 4 had all subjects make a note about their choices. However,
some subjects made the note after rather than before choosing. The authors generally find
that defaults were perceived as fairer when they were designed to benefit the environment
and not the landlord.
Kroese et al. (2015) conducted a field experiment at a train station. They created three
different treatments at the three kiosks in the station. One kiosk was the control, and the
placement of snacks was the same arrangement as normal kiosk operation. In the other two
kiosks, healthier snacks were moved closer to the register. The third kiosk disclosed the
nudge, posting a sign stating “we help you make healthier choices.” The number of subjects
was not reported. The total number of snacks purchased was 1,126. The difference in the
number of healthy purchases between the control and nudge kiosk is statistically significant,
but that the difference between the nudge with and without disclosure is not statistically
significant.
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Bruns et al. (2016) report on a laboratory experiment in which student subjects were
endowed ¿10 and asked if they wanted to donate to an organization that bought and then
retired carbon emissions licenses. In the control condition, the default was a ¿0 contribution.
In the four treatment conditions, the default was a ¿8 contribution. One of the treatment
conditions had no disclosure the other three had disclosures of the default, its intention, or
both. They find that the default was effective (contributions were higher than the control
condition), but that the difference between contributions in the non-disclosure conditions and
the disclosure conditions were not statically significant. However, the small sample size and
multiple treatment cells undermine the power of the study, which does not present a formal
analysis of power. Additionally, the authors estimate contributions using a tobit rather than
hurdle model. They also estimate effects for each of the different treatments rather than the
impact of the default across all the treatments and then the additional impact of each of the
disclosures. The analysis raises questions about their conclusions.
Isoni et al. (2017) conducted three experiments. The first one was conducted on MTurk,
and had subjects choose between lottery pairs. Valuing the lotteries involved processing
much information, and subjects were not given any aid in aggregating the information or
determining the expected values of the two lotteries. However, one lottery strictly dominated
the other. Subjects were asked to select one lottery from each pair but paid a flat partici-
pation fee. There was a control group who had no default. Of the remaining subjects, half
the subjects had the dominated lottery preselected in each pair, and the other half had the
dominating lottery preselected. The default was crossed with a disclosure. About a quarter
of the subjects with a default, and all of those without a default saw no disclosure. The
remaining subjects saw one of three disclosures. One simply reported that defaults guide
people to choices and that people often choose the default with out investigating alternatives.
The second and third added either positive or negative connotation. The second added that
defaults can guide people toward the best option. The third instead added that defaults can
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exploit people. The study found a strong default effect, and that disclosing the default did
not reduce the effects.
In the second study, the authors’ focus is “third-party” disclosure. Subjects were invited
to watch an online video and incentivized to pay attention; subjects who correctly answered
comprehension questions at the end were eligible for a lottery drawing. In the treatment
condition, the video informed viewers about nudges and their impact. A week later, the
researchers invited subjects into the lab for the experiment. The experiment comprised two
tasks. The first task was the same lottery task as described above. The authors find no
default effects in the unaware conditions. However, in the aware condition the defaults are
effective, and cannot explain the result. The second task was the Gneezy Potters investment
task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). Here the default was on a secondary decision: how often
the subject would make the investment decision. The default was either decide every round
or every three rounds. The latter is associated with greater investment and higher expected
payouts. In this task, very few people switched the reporting frequency. In the final study,
the authors repeated the first study in the lab with salient incentives. However, the were
unable to produce a default effect, except for the good default and then only at the p < 0.10
level.
III.2.1 Anchoring
While information about default nudges has not yet been shown to have any impact,
information about another nudge, an anchor can attenuate the effect of an anchor. Epley and
Gilovich (2005) report on two experiments in which they forewarn subjects in a treatment
condition and compare the accuracy of their responses to a control group which did not
receive a forewarning. They ask two types of questions: questions in which an anchor is
provided, e.g. “What is the population of Chicago? (anchor = 200,000);” and questions
in which the structure prompts subject to create their own anchor, e.g. “In what year
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was George Washington elected President of the United States?” They find that responses
from subjects who were made aware of the effect of anchors were more accurate, when the
anchor was “self-generated” but find that awareness had no impact when the anchor was
provided. Wilson et al. (1996) ask a single question: the number of physicians listed in the
local phone book, and provide an anchor in the form of an identification number they were
asked to compare to the estimate. While this is a question subjects are less likely to know
the answer to, so difficult to compare to results from less obscure questions, the results are
consistent with Epley and Gilovich’s – awareness seemed to have no impact on a provided
anchor. Given Epley and Gilovich (2005) findings and the findings of the previous chapter,
information can eliminate loss framing effects, we design a experiment to test the impact of
information on default nudges, using an incentizived choice in the laboratory.
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Table III.1: Experiments testing the impact of awareness on defaults
Study Exp Setting Subject Sample Treatment Salient Statistical Comment Default
Pool Size Cells Incentives Methods Effect
Loewenstein
et al. (2015)
Online CMU
Alumni and
NYT
readers
758 4 No,
hypothetical
choices and
participants
not paid.
Chi-square
tests and
multino-
mial
logit
Awareness
statement
confounds
message that the
subject could
have had a
different default
with the fact that
others are being
treated
differently.
Yes1
Steffel et al.
(2016)
1a Lab University
Students
363 4 No, class
credit
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Statement reveals
nudge and likely
impact.
Yes
1b MTurk Adults 429 4 No,
maximum
total
payment
$0.35
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Yes
1c Field University
Population
210 4 Possibly
biased
because the
item is free,
but
otherwise a
binding
choice about
consumption.
Chi-square
tests and
maximum
likelihood
Disclosure
included intent of
nudges “healthy”
vs. “more
indulgent”
Yes
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Study Exp Setting Subject Sample Treatment Salient Statistical Comment Default
Pool Size Cells Incentives Methods Effect
2a MTurk Adults 779 8 No, $0.15
flat payment.
Hypothetical
choice.
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Statement reveals
nudge and likely
impact. Intent
implied.
Yes
2b MTurk Adults 817 8 No, $0.15
flat payment.
Hypothetical
choice.
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Disclosure reveals
either
environmental
motive or desire
for tax break.
Yes
3 MTurk Adults 690 8 No, $0.15
flat payment.
Hypothetical
choice.
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Yes
4 MTurk Adults 390 4 No, $0.50
flat payment.
Hypothetical
choice.
Not stated,
but appears
to be an
ANOVA
Yes
Kroese
et al.
(2015)
Field Customers
at Train
Station
Unknown 3 Yes, snacks
subjects
bought.
ANCOVA
They
should have
used a test
which
compared
healthy
snacks to
total snacks
across the
three
kiosks.
Sign posted
saying ‘we help
you make
healthier choices.’
Yes
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Study Exp Setting Subject Sample Treatment Salient Statistical Comment Default
Pool Size Cells Incentives Methods Effect
Bruns et al.
(2016)
Lab University
Students
214 5 Possible
house money
effects but
otherwise
yes.
Fail to use
hurdle
model.
Also
unclear if
they are
interpreting
estimators
correctly
Using the words
“Different
amount” on
decision screen
may influence
subjects’
decisions.
Yes
Isoni et al.
(2017)
1 MTurk Adults 1279 10 No, flat fee of
$0.50.
Default
effect:
Mann-
Whitney
tests.
Information
impact: not
reported.
Yes
2 Lab University
Students
131 4 Yes Mann-
Whitney
and Fisher
exact p
tests
No
3 Lab University
Students
233 10 Yes Mann-
Whitney
and Fisher
exact p
tests
No
1 No default effect for overall goals, but there was a default effect for specific procedures.
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III.3 Experimental Design and Methods
III.3.1 Design
Figure III.1 illustrates the between-subject, 2 x 2 experimental design employed. We
offered laboratory subjects, who just completed another experiment6, the opportunity to
purchase a carbon offset using part of the earnings from the previous experiment. Subjects
were asked to confirm their decision or, if they wish, go back and change it. Subjects were
either nudged to: 1) Buy or 2) Do Not Buy the carbon offset by varying the default (pre-
selected option). This was crossed with whether or not subjects are: 1) “Aware” (when
subjects were asked if they want to change their choice, they are informed they were nudged
and about the likely impact of the nudge.) or 2) “Unaware” (they were not given this
information.).7 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment cells. Table
III.3 reports the number of subjects in each cell.
Table III.2: Treatment Assignment
Default
Buy Do Not Buy Total
Aware 53 53 106
Unaware 54 53 107
Total 107 106 213
Our design allows us to use the full subject pool when analyzing the main effect of the
nudge. It does not allow us to determine the un-nudged rate of buying but maximizes the
difference between the two groups we compare by nudging both groups in opposite directions.
6The subjects had just completed an experiment in which they earned money in a real effort task. All
subjects were paid in both loss gain and gain frame depending on the round. Some subjects had the
isomorphism of the payment systems explained to them, and were informed about the typical effects of loss
framing.
7In order to gain power, we departed from Loewenstein et al.’s design, in which all subjects are made
aware of the decision, some before the decision some after.
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Figure III.1: Experimental Design
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The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects who
had already accumulated laboratory earnings are given information about carbon offsets, and
how offsets reduce greenhouse gases and global warming. Subjects were given the opportunity
to have an offset purchased for them from terrapass, a leading provider. Each one offsets
of the equivalent of 1,000 lbs. of CO2 and cost $4.99. This amount was chosen because
it was approximately the amount of carbon the average person in the university’s zip code
generates in a week (Jones and Kammen, 2014). It is also salient relative to expected earning
($23.50) from the preceding experiment. Subjects were informed that should they opt to
purchase a certificate cash would be collected at the end of the session (to ensure privacy
of their decision) and a certificate verifying the offset would be emailed to them within 24
hours.
Figure III.2 is a screenshot of the purchase decision. In the case presented, the subject
was given a default nudge to buy. The default option appeared on top in all cases. Figure
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III.3 shows screenshots of the option to revisit the choice for subjects in the aware condition.
In III.3a, the subject had been given the nudge to buy, and choose to purchase the offset.
In III.3b, the subject had been given the nudge not to buy, and choose not to purchase the
offset. Subjects in the unaware condition saw the same choice screen without the text at
the top. If the subject clicked “Go back and choose again,” he or she returned to the first
screen. This time subject’s initial choice was pre-selected. There was also a warning that
this choice was final. If the subject clicked “Confirm this choice,” he or she went directly to
the outcome screen. Subjects then completed a questionnaire. As the subjects completed
the questionnaire, they individually went to a side room where cash for any purchased offsets
could be collected. The full experimental procedure is included in the appendix.
Figure III.2: Purchase Choice
Figure III.3: Revisit Option with Information
(a) Nudged to Buy and Bought Offset (b) Nudged not to Buy and did not Buy Offset
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III.3.2 Method of Analysis
We initially compare purchase rates across the treatment cells. We test the effectiveness
of the nudge with a chi-square test and t-test comparing purchase rates of subjects who were
nudged to Buy to purchase rates of subjects who were nudged Do Not Buy. We divide the
data by Awareness to test the impact of information on the nudge, and compare purchase
rates between Buy and Do Not Buy subjects within each condition.
For our main analysis, we run a logistic regression on the final purchase decision:
YF = α ∗BuyNudge+ β ∗ Aware+ δ ∗BuyNudge ∗ Aware+ φ ∗M + γ ∗X + ε
where YF is the final outcome variable and takes a value of 1 if the subject purchased
a carbon offset and 0 if the subject did not purchase an offset. BuyNudge is a dummy
variable indicating if the Buy option was preselected, and α provides an estimate of how
much more likely subjects who received the Buy nudge are to purchase the offset relative to
those subjects who received the Do Not Buy nudge. Aware is a dummy variable indicating
whether the subject was shown the awareness statement, and β estimates the impact of
awareness on the Do Not Buy nudge. BuyNudge ∗ Aware is an interaction term. Adding
δ to β provides an estimate of the impact of Awareness on the Buy nudge. β and δ are the
estimates of primary interest. Earnings M and demographics X are added as controls.
Finally, we analyze the impact of providing information about the typical effect of de-
faults. Subjects in the Aware Condition only received this information after their initial
decision. Subjects in the Unaware Condition did not receive the information about the im-
pact of defaults but were given the opportunity to return to the purchase decision screen.
A difference in rate of return to the screen would be the initial sign the information had an
impact. Changing the purchase decision once at the screen would be subsequent but stronger
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evidence of the impact. We compare the number of aware subjects who returned to changed
their choice to the number of unaware subjects who changed their choice, and how choices
changed.
III.4 Results
III.4.1 Context
The sessions were conducted in the ExCen laboratory at Georgia State University in the
summer of 2017 after another experiment. This addition lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Subjects earned $23.37 on average in the first experiment. Table III.3 reports the number
of subjects in each treatment cell.
Table III.3: Treatment Assignment
Default
Buy Do Not Buy Total
Aware 53 53 106
Unaware 54 53 107
Total 107 106 213
Table III.4 reports on the demographic characteristics of the subjects by treatment group.
In total 213 undergraduate students participated in our experiment, 139 of whom identified
as female, 73 as male, and 1 as other.
III.4.2 Purchase Rates
Overall more subjects who had “Do Not Buy”(No) preselected bought offsets more fre-
quently than those that that had “Buy”(Yes) preselected. This is the opposite direction of
the expected effect. Table III.5 reports the number of offsets purchased and percentages of
subjects by cell who purchased an offset. A t-test and chi square test were both statistically
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Table III.4: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects
Variable Mean SD
Female .65 .48
Age 21.17 3.09
Hispanic .07 .25
Asian .15 .36
White .08 .28
African American .55 .5
US Citizen .92 .28
significant, p=0.024 and p=0.024. A post experiment power analysis indicates that for a
significance level of 0.05 the experiment had the power of 0.62.
Table III.5: Number of Carbon Offsets Purchased Overall
Nudge Didn’t Buy Bought Total
No 78 28 106
73.6% 26.4%
Yes 92 15 107
86.0% 14.0%
Total 170 43 213
79.8% 20.2%
The difference is driven by those in the Unaware treatment. Table III.6 reports the same
statistics as above for only the Unaware subjects. The differences are statistically significant
p=0.010 and p=0.010 for t-test and chi-square.
Table III.6: Number of Carbon Offsets Purchased for Unaware Subjects
Nudge Didn’t Buy Bought Total
No 35 18 53
66.0% 34.0%
Yes 47 7 54
85.1% 14.9%
Total 82 25 107
76.1% 23.9%
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The is almost no difference in the Aware treatment. Table III.7 reports the same statistics
as above for only the Aware subjects.
Table III.7: Number of Carbon Offsets Purchased for Aware Subjects
Nudge Didn’t Buy Bought Total
No 43 10 53
81.1% 18.9%
Yes 45 8 53
84.9% 15.1%
Total 88 18 106
83.0% 17.0%
There was imbalance across the treatments in subjects’ perceptions of how important
climate protection is, and in the subjects’ perceptions about how effective terrapass carbon
offset are at preventing climate change. These imbalances explain why the default seems to
have the reverse effect than the one expected. Tables III.8 and III.9 report the responses to
the questionnaire items: “How important is climate protection for you?” and “How effective
do you think buying offsets from terapass is at preventing climate change?” by awareness
and whether the subject was nudged ‘No’ or ‘Yes’ on the purchase decision. T-tests show
that the difference in responses across the nudge to these two questions were statistically
significant (p=0.008 and p=0.022). In theory, as these questions were asked after the subject
was nudged and made a purchase decision, the responses might be biased – subjects might
rationalize their decisions as effected by the nudge in their responses. While this is possible,
it seems unlikely, if for no other reason than it would leave no explanation as to why the
nudge had the opposite effect than the one expected.
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Table III.8: Distribution of Climate Attitudes
Importance of Unaware Aware Total
Climate Protection Nudge Nudge Nudge
No Yes No Yes No Yes
not important at all 0 3 2 2 2 5
not important 0 3 3 3 2 6
indifferent 5 11 11 14 16 25
important 31 27 19 22 50 49
very important 17 10 18 12 35 22
Table III.9: Distribution of Perceptions of Terrapass
Effectiveness of Unaware Aware Total
terrapass offsets Nudge Nudge Nudge
No Yes No Yes No Yes
completely ineffective 1 5 2 2 3 7
4 7 9 12 13 19
somewhat effective 26 30 19 22 45 52
14 9 17 9 31 18
very effective 8 3 6 8 14 11
III.4.3 Logistic Regressions
Tables III.10 and III.11 report the estimated marginal effects from logistic regressions on
the decision to buy a carbon offset, indicated by a “1” in the dependent variable. Table III.10
does not control for the subjects’ responses to the questionnaire items: “How important is
climate protection for you?” and “How effective do you think buying offsets from terapass is
at preventing climate change?” Buy Preselected, the estimate for the impact of the default
nudge, is statistically significant in all the models in Table III.10 but it is in the opposite
direction than we expected – having Buy preselected is associated with a lower probability of
buying. This result follows from the higher purchase rates seen in Table III.5, but is driven
by the difference in the importance of climate change and perceived effectiveness of terapass
offsets. All the regression models in Table III.11 include responses to these questionnaire
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items; the estimate for the impact of the default nudge, is statistically insignificant in all
models in this table. The lowest p value for it in any model was 0.221, in Model 1.
Table III.10: Average Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Default Default Impact
VARIABLES on Unaware on All of Info
Buy Preselected -0.208*** -0.124** -0.191**
(0.0774) (0.0544) (0.0744)
Aware -0.0645 -0.123*
(0.0542) (0.0689)
Buy Preselected & Aware 0.150
(0.110)
Observations 107 213 213
Log pseudolikelihood 0.0581 0.0306 0.0391
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.11: Average Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression, cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Default Default
on Unaware on All Impact
VARIABLES Env. Belief Env. Belief Demog of Default Demog
Buy Preselected -0.0938 -0.0527 -0.0457 -0.0808 -0.0630
(0.0751) (0.0493) (0.0501) (0.0668) (0.0684)
Earnings All Periods -0.000139 -0.000622 -0.000725 -0.000654 -0.000738
(0.00160) (0.00112) (0.00117) (0.00112) (0.00117)
Climate Protection Important 0.166*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.0546) (0.0346) (0.0366) (0.0352) (0.0372)
Terrapass’s Effectiveness 0.107*** 0.0899*** 0.0920*** 0.0917*** 0.0929***
(0.0374) (0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0244)
Female -0.000858 -0.00878
(0.0531) (0.0533)
Age 0.00854 0.00820
(0.00627) (0.00626)
Hispanic 0.0480 0.0418
(0.110) (0.111)
US Citizen -0.0758 -0.0746
(0.0779) (0.0799)
Asian 0.0413 0.0497
(0.0894) (0.0889)
White 0.126 0.104
(0.0910) (0.0919)
African American 0.0656 0.0712
(0.0670) (0.0668)
Aware -0.102* -0.0874
(0.0612) (0.0624)
Buy Preselected & Aware 0.0760 0.0481
(0.0992) (0.100)
Observations 107 213 213 213 213
Log pseudolikelihood 0.222 0.234 0.255 0.247 0.265
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.12 reports the estimated marginal effects from semi-nonparametric (SNP) max-
imum likelihood estimates of the decision to buy a carbon offset, using Stata’s snp command
(De Luca, 2008). The SNP estimates do not qualitatively vary from the estimates from the
logit. The SNP estimates are larger in absolute magnitude (0.0016 for model 1 and 0.052 for
model 5) and the estimates for standard errors are also larger. Even using SNP methods,
the impact of the nudge is not statistically significant in any of the models.
Table III.12: Average Marginal Effects from SNP Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Default Default Impact
VARIABLES on Unaware on All Demog of Info Demog
Buy Preselected -0.0922 -0.0146 0.00256 -0.0606 -0.0110
(0.0819) (0.0441) (0.0456) (0.0727) (0.0625)
Earnings All Periods -0.000441 -0.000806 -0.00101 -0.000974 -0.00105
(0.00184) (0.000920) (0.000999) (0.00108) (0.00105)
Climate Protection Important 0.172*** 0.140*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.148***
(0.0522) (0.0306) (0.0314) (0.0343) (0.0330)
Terrapass’s Effectiveness 0.100** 0.0908*** 0.0947*** 0.0868*** 0.0944***
(0.0411) (0.0250) (0.0271) (0.0263) (0.0283)
Female -0.0143 -0.0133
(0.0476) (0.0491)
Age 0.00319 0.00349
(0.00514) (0.00538)
Hispanic -0.0147 -0.0202
(0.0840) (0.0876)
Citizen -0.0295 -0.0367
(0.0723) (0.0784)
Asian 0.0291 0.0377
(0.0753) (0.0789)
White 0.120 0.103
(0.0825) (0.0871)
African American 0.0699 0.0708
(0.0583) (0.0617)
Aware -0.106 -0.0685
(0.0668) (0.0605)
Buy Preselected & Aware 0.0761 0.0368
(0.0918) (0.0892)
Observations 107 213 213 213 213
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.13 reports the estimated marginal effects Firth logistic regressions on the deci-
sion to buy a carbon offset, using Stata’s firthlogit command. Like the SNP estimates the
results do not qualitatively differ from the logit estimates. The estimated effect of the nudge
is not statistically significant in any of the models.
Table III.13: Coefficient estimates from Firth Logistic Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Default Default Impact
VARIABLES on Unaware on All Demog of Info Demog
Buy Preselected -0.0907 -0.0522 -0.0434 -0.0789 -0.0595
(0.0754) (0.0497) (0.0511) (0.0673) (0.0700)
Earnings All Periods -0.000122 -0.000600 -0.000750 -0.000631 -0.000760
(0.00160) (0.00113) (0.00119) (0.00113) (0.00120)
Climate Protection Important 0.161*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.155*** 0.154***
(0.0554) (0.0350) (0.0372) (0.0357) (0.0378)
Terrapass’s Effectiveness 0.104*** 0.0888*** 0.0900*** 0.0901*** 0.0906***
(0.0380) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0251)
Female -0.00431 -0.0113
(0.0541) (0.0546)
Age 0.00828 0.00796
(0.00604) (0.00608)
Hispanic 0.0614 0.0562
(0.106) (0.108)
US Citizen -0.0787 -0.0775
(0.0785) (0.0807)
Asian 0.0407 0.0486
(0.0901) (0.0900)
White 0.123 0.101
(0.0907) (0.0924)
African American 0.0581 0.0630
(0.0677) (0.0679)
Aware -0.0993 -0.0827
(0.0621) (0.0639)
Buy Preselected & Aware 0.0745 0.0474
(0.1000) (0.102)
Observations 107 213 213 213 213
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
94
III.4.4 Awareness
I failed to create a default effect so Awareness does not serve the role I intended it to be – a
test of the impact of information on the default effect. Instead it is a test of a placebo effect.8
There is no evidence that information had an effect on the decision to return to the purchase
decision screen or changing one’s decision once at the screen. Of the 213 subjects, only nine
subjects choose to revisit the screen with the purchase decision. Six of these subjects were in
the Aware condition. A t-test shows this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.30).
Only two subjects, one from each the Aware and Unaware treatments, actually changed
their choices once back at the purchase screen, and changed the decision to purchase. The
coefficient estimates of the impact of awareness on the purchase decision are significant at the
p < 0.10 level in logit models that do not include demographics. The estimate was intended
as a measure of the impact of Awareness on the Do Not Buy nudge. However, as only
two subjects changed their purchase decisions, the estimate is capturing differences before
subjects received the information. This difference may be due to demographic imbalance in
treatment assignment.
III.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I adapt Loewenstein et al.’s experiment 2015, which tests the impact of
awareness on a default nudge, to a salient decision in a laboratory setting. After subjects
have earned payments in another experiment, they are offered the opportunity to purchase
a carbon offset, and preselect yes or no on the purchase decision. Treatment subjects are
8Just as a patient’s belief about the efficacy of a treatment can effect medical outcomes, information
provided to a subject or a subjects existing beliefs about a treatment or product can effect their perceptions
of the treatment and decisions they make. Shen et al. (2012) show that subjects who were told that an
energy drink “significantly improved mental functioning” solved a greater number of puzzles after drinking
it than subjects who were told it only “slightly” improved functioning. Kuenzel et al. (2012) show subjects
who were told a tea is relaxing report being more relaxed after drinking it but not if the made aware of the
experimental manipulation.
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informed of the default and its intent. All subjects are given the opportunity to change
their purchase decision. I am unable to produce a default effect – Isoni et al. (2017) also
had this issue in their two incentivized experiments. I have contributed to the evidence that
defaults are not always effective. In this case, it seems like the nudge was ineffective because
the demand for carbon offset certificates was very inelastic; there were very few marginal
subjects to be nudged. Most subjects seemed to value the offset according to preferences
regarding climate protection and beliefs about what is effective at preventing climate change.
For many subject these beliefs were strong enough that the nudge would not have any impact,
and only impact the very few subjects with weaker preferences.
The issue of whether default effects are robust to awareness to their utilization and intent
remains an important and open question. Future research could use a similar design, but
different decision to test the impact of awareness on the default effect. The decision would
need to be one in which there were greater numbers of subjects who had difficulty valuing
the options, and were at the margin of choosing between the options.
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Appendices
A Medication Categorization
I identified which of the top grossing medications were branded medications with only
indirect generic competition (BMIGC). First, I ascertain which were still under patent in
the relevant years, via the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Orange Book website.
Next, I identified the medication’s class and what other medications were in the class. I
also noted if there was any medication that was clearly superior, e.g. much more effective or
tolerable. Then I checked to see if any of these had generic equivalents in the Orange Book.
If there was a generic equivalent for one of the other medications in the class, I marked
the medication as a BMIGC, and likely to be affected by the regulation. I also marked the
generic equivalent as a likely substitute.
A few the top grossing medications serve as examples and illustrate how the categoriza-
tion worked. Abilify was under patent protection until 2015, so was a branded medication
with no generic equivalent. It is an “atypical antipsychotic,” but there are other atypical
antipsychotics, chiefly risperidone, for which there were generic equivalents as early as 2008.
Accordingly, I mark Abilify as a BMIGC, and risperidone as a medication toward which
there is likely to be substitution.
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Celebrex was the first Cox 2 inhibitor. These represent a significant innovation in treat-
ment and as Celebrex is the first there are no generics in the class. Accordingly, I do not
mark Celebrex as a BMIGC.
Simvastatin was available as a generic as early as 2006, so also is not a BMIGC, but is
marked as a substitute for other statins.
Table A.1: Classification of Medications
Medication Class Generic Substitutes
Gen.
of Sub.
BMIGC Sub
Abilify atypical
antipsychotic
No Yes, resperidone Yes 3 7
Celebrex Cox 2
inhibitor
No Yes, but it was 1st No 7 7
Simvastatin statin Yes, Jun06 7 3
Lipitor statin No Yes, Simvastatin Yes 3 7
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B Robustness Checks
Following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I perform a random inference test, designed
to be in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010). I run probit regressions in which treatment is
assigned to a control state starting in 2009 rather than MA. These regressions are run for
each of the 27 control states for the likelihood that survey respondent is on a BMIGC and for
the likelihood that survey respondents are on any medication. I compare the p values of the
coefficient estimates of the regulation to the p value of the estimate of the actual regulation.
For the regressions on the likelihood of taking a BIMGC, no state had a lower p value than
MA. For the regressions on the likelihood of taking any medication, three states had a lower
p value than MA, Colorado, Indiana and Ohio.
Again following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I collapse the data by year and state
and run regressions on the probability of taking a BMIGC, any medication, or a substitute
medication. As the the data has been collapsed, the outcome is no longer binary but the
proportion of people in that state-year taking medication. These regression use state averages
of the demographic control variables9. Table B.1 reports the results of these regressions. In
the general population, the results are no longer statistically significant. The magnitude of
the estimates are generally smaller but in the same direction as the previous estimates.
9Poverty category, and education level had been treated as a series of dummy variables in previous
regressions.
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Table B.1: Regression Estimates when Data is Collapsed by State and Year
Are Taking A BMIGC
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction -0.008 -0.114** -0.030*
(0.011) (0.044) (0.016)
Observations 336 335 336
R-squared 0.886 0.664 0.821
Are Taking Any Prescribed Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction 0.000 -0.024 -0.017
(0.019) (0.029) (0.024)
Observations 336 335 336
R-squared 0.781 0.461 0.669
Are Taking a “Substitute” Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction 0.011 -0.012 -0.002
(0.013) (0.039) (0.015)
Observations 336 335 336
R-squared 0.958 0.935 0.935
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Again following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I collapse the data by year and MA
or not-MA and run regressions on the probability of taking a BMIGC, any medication, or
a substitute medication. Again the outcome is the proportion of people taking medication.
Table B.2 reports the results of these regressions. The results are no longer statistically
significant.
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Table B.2: Regression Estimates when Data is Collapsed by MA or non-MA and Year
Are Taking A BMIGC
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction -0.062 -0.226 -0.035
(0.444) (0.273) (0.089)
Observations 24 24 24
R-squared 0.990 0.998 0.977
Are Taking Any Prescribed Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction 0.080 0.103 -0.071
(0.066) (0.144) (0.050)
Observations 24 24 24
R-squared 1.000 0.997 0.979
Are Taking a “Substitute” Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction -0.051 -0.535 0.073
(0.327) (0.970) (0.102)
Observations 24 24 24
R-squared 0.999 0.994 0.993
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Again following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I collapse the data by year and MA
or not-MA and run regressions on the probability of taking a BMIGC, any medication, or
a substitute medication. Again the outcome is the proportion of people taking medication.
Table B.3 reports the results of these regressions. The results are no longer statistically sig-
nificant. There are very few observations given how the data was collapsed, so the estimates
are noisy but overlap with the main estimates in confidence intervals.
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Table B.3: Regression Estimates when Data is Collapsed by State and Pre or Post Regulation
Are Taking A BMIGC
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction 0.026 -0.197 0.003
(0.062) (0.174) (0.051)
Observations 56 56 56
R-squared 0.988 0.958 0.980
Are Taking Any Prescribed Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction 0.053 -0.135 -0.024
(0.117) (0.089) (0.074)
Observations 56 56 56
R-squared 0.980 0.964 0.970
Are Taking a “Substitute” Medication
VARIABLES All 65+ Empr Insrd
Marketing Restriction -0.027 -0.750 -0.009
(0.110) (0.866) (0.128)
Observations 56 56 56
R-squared 0.995 0.938 0.978
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Instructions for Real Effort Experiment
Welcome and thank you participating in this experiment. The task in today’s experiment
is very simple. Correctly count the number of “1” in a 5 x 5 grid, enter that number in the
input box, and press the “OK” button. See the screen shot below.
If you are correct, the word “Correct” will be displayed, and a new grid will immediately
appear on your screen. Otherwise, the word “Incorrect” will be displayed and you can make
another attempt at the same grid.
There will be one practice round and 3 paid rounds. All will be 240 seconds (4 minutes)
long. Your earnings today will be the sum of your earning in each of the paid rounds. The
way we calculate your earning will change each round. We will tell you how your pay is
determined before you start each round.
During all the rounds, you also have the option of taking a paid break. You can take this
break by pressing the red button at the bottom of the screen that says “break”. The break
will last 20 seconds. You will not be able to work during the break, but you will be paid 30
cents. You can take as many of these paid breaks as you want, and whenever you want, so
long as there are at least 20 seconds left in the round.
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The below instructions would be given only to those in the “Aware” treatment:
Previous research has shown that the way in which people are paid, not just how much
they are paid, can affect how hard and how carefully people work in a task. During this
experiment, you will be paid in two ways, depending on the round:
1. You will be paid at the end of the round. You will receive $0.25 for each grid you
correctly count (up to a maximum of 100 grids).
For example, if you correctly counted 20 grids; you would get 25¢ for each of the 20
grids, so we would pay you $5.
2. You will be paid $25 in advance. However at the end of the round, if have you correctly
counted fewer than 100 grids, you will have to give some money back. For every grid
you are short of 100, you will lose $0.25.
For example, if you correctly counted 20 grids; you would be 80 grids short of 100, you
would lose 25 for each of the 80 grids, so we would take back $20, from the money you
got in advance.
Before starting a round, you will be told which way we will pay you for that round. Even
though the two payment procedures are different, the amount of money you receive for a
specific number of correctly counted grids is the same. In both examples above, the person
solved 20 grids and earned $5 ($25-$20=$5).
Although the earnings are the same for both procedures, prior research with factory workers
and school teachers has shown that people, on average, work harder and earn more when
the second procedure is used. This outcome doesn’t happen for everyone, but it seems to
happen on average. So we offer both procedures in the experiment today.
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The below instructions would be displayed on screen at the beginning of the
appropriate round:
For this round, you will be paid $25 in advance. However at the end of the round, if have
you correctly counted fewer than 100 grids, you will have to give some money back. For
every grid you are short of 100, you will lose $0.25. In addition, you will be paid 30 for any
break you take.
For example, if you correctly counted 20 grids and took 3 breaks; you would be 80
grids short of 100, you would lose 25¢ for each of the 80 grids, so we would take back
$20, from the money you got in advance. You would then receive 90¢, 30¢ for each of
the 3 breaks.
For this round, you will be paid at the end of the round. You will receive $0.25 for each
grid you correctly count (up to a maximum of 100 grids). You will also be paid 30¢ for any
breaks you take.
 For example, if you correctly counted 20 grids and took 3 breaks; you would get 25¢
for each of the 20 grids, so we would pay you $5. You would then receive 90¢, 30¢ for
each of the 3 breaks.
Now that you have had the chance to experience both payment systems, we are asking which
you prefer. For the final round, you will get this choice with a 2/3 probability, based on
a random draw from a bingo cage. You will each be assigned one of three colors. We will
place four bingo balls of each of those colors into a cage and then draw one ball. If the ball
matches your color, you do not get your choice. You also have the option of saying it doesn’t
matter. If you choose this option, you will be randomly assigned to one of the payment
systems. In all cases, you will still be paid 30¢ for any breaks you take.
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D Supplemental Figures
Figure D.1: Breaks Taken
(a) By Period (b) By Frame
Figure D.2: Errors Made
(a) By Period (b) By Frame
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Figure D.3: Residuals from Regression on Correct Grids
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Carbon-Offset Task   
Display on their screens and the projector and read aloud:  
 
Subjects then see on their screens: 
 
Subjects then see on their screens: 
 
Subjects will randomly be assigned (at an individual level) to have either the yes or no option pre-
checked.  The pre-checked option will always be the first option. 
After they click “Confirm,” they proceed to the next screen. 
Aware subjects will see one of these four screens: 
   
   
These four screens represent the four possible cases given the experimental design.  In the top left the 
subject had a default of not buying, but selected to purchase the offset.  In the top right the subject also 
had the default to not buy and selected to not purchase the offset.  In the bottom left the default was to 
buy, and the subject selected to purchase the offset. In the bottom right, the default was to buy, and 
subject selected to not purchase the offset.     
Unaware subjects would not see the top section, and would only see bottom part: 
   
Subjects who selected to buy the offset will see the screen on the left.  Subjects who selected not to buy 
will see the screen on the right. 
 
If the “Confirm this choice” is selected the subject advances to a wait screen. 
 
If the “Go back and choose again” is selected the subject returns to the screen with the yes and no check 
boxes. It is the same screen as before, only with a warning that there will be no further opportunities to 
change his or her choice. The other possible difference is which option is pre-selected .  Whatever the 
subject chose previously will be preselected.  
 
After the subjects click confirm on this screen, they will see one of the two messages, depending upon 
their final decision. 
  
Staff will pass by each desk and give all subjects a slip of paper that documents their decision.  After all 
the subjects have been given slips, the questionnaire is launched.  Subjects work at their own paces on 
the questionnaire and generally finish at different times.  As each subject completes the questionnaire, 
he or she will be asked to individually go to the laboratory annex, so that his or her purchase decision 
can be realized without being revealed to other subjects.  The student PI looks at the slip.  If the subject 
has selected to purchase a carbon offset, $4.99 is collected from him or her along with the name he or 
she wants on the certificate and the email address he or she wants the certificate sent to.  The subject 
then leaves.       
F Questionnaire Materials
Figure F.1: Questions Regarding Climate Protection Attitudes and Offset Effectiveness
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